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This Article will examine the use of conciliation as a mechanism for the resolution of dis-
putes arising out of trade, investment, and other business relationships in this broadly framed
transnational system. Part I presents an overview of dispute resolution methods. Part II provides a
definition of “international conciliation.” Part III discusses the various uses of international concil-
iation as a method for the resolution of international conflicts; this Part highlights several relevant
international agreements and organizations. Part IV argues in favor of conciliation as a means for
achieving the settlement of international economic and business disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
The hallmark of dispute' settlement in the international
system is its consensual nature. Disorder in relations between
entities which have formal status on this level, primarily the
nation-state and certain international organizations, cannot be
remedied unless all the parties involved consent both to the
implementation of the process of dispute resolution and the
specific mechanism to be engaged. This remains true whether
the particular method selected is adjudicative or diplomatic in
nature. This configuration of the international order is the
product of its decentralized format where all states are, in prin-
ciple, juridically equal and where there is no superior govern-
mental entity with the authority to prescribe, adjudicate, and
enforce the law.
Another layer can be added if one expands the boundaries
of the international order to include, pursuant to transnational
law concepts,2 the activities of private entities-individual or
juridical-who are participating in international activities out
of which disputes arise. Their transactions are often business-
related, involving international trade, investment, or finance.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.
The Author would like to express her gratitude to Ted McDorman for his critique of
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1. See generally Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.),
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at I I (Aug. 30) (providing leading definition of term
"dispute"). The court stated that "[a] dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or
fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons." Id.
2. P.JESSuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). Judge Jessup, in his seminal work on
the subject, defined "transnational law" as including "all law which regulates actions
or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law
are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories"
and "transnational situations" as those involving "individuals, corporations, states,
organizations of states, or other groups." Id. at 2-3.
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These relationships may attract an international or national
scheme of dispute settlement pursuant to treaty or domestic
regulation. Further, the parties themselves may be able pri-
vately to construct their own dispute resolution mechanism by
contract. In both scenarios the genesis of the process is con-
sent-either of the relevant states or of the private actors.
This Article will examine the use of conciliation as a mech-
anism for the resolution of disputes arising out of trade, invest-
ment, and other business relationships in this broadly framed
transnational system. Conciliation, using a third party to pro-
vide non-binding recommendations to the disputants in an at-
tempt to resolve the problem, is found in every stratum of the
transnational business system. The variants of conciliation
that are created and the viability of conciliation as an effective
mechanism for the resolution of international economic and
business disputes will also be addressed. Part I presents an
overview of dispute resolution methods. Part II provides a
definition of "international conciliation." Part III discusses
the various uses of international conciliation as a method for
the resolution of international conflicts; this Part highlights
several relevant international agreements and organizations.
Part IV argues in favor of conciliation as a means for achieving
the settlement of international economic and business dis-
putes. This Article concludes that the international commu-
nity should make greater use of conciliation as a pathway to the
settlement of economic and business disputes, rather than au-
tomatically taking the more complex arbitration route to dis-
pute settlement.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF METHODS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM
AND THE PARTIES INVOLVED
The forms of dispute resolution that are utilized in the
transnational system include negotiation, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, and judicial settlement. Although non-judi-
cial methods of dispute resolution are also found in the domes-
tic arena, a distinction can be made between the international
system, on the one hand, and national legal systems on the
other. On the international level these procedures are the fa-
miliar and preferred forms of dispute settlement. In the do-
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mestic realm of many states, however, such mechanisms are
categorized under the rubric "alternative dispute resolution"
since they are considered to be a supplement, or even
subordinate, to the official centralist structure ofjudicial settle-
ment.5 In contrast, extrajudicial methods are the predominant
modes of dispute determination in a variety of countries, in-
cluding the Pacific Rim Asian nations, based on their cultural
heritage.4
Dispute resolution on the international plane can be di-
vided into the two categories of adjudicative and diplomatic
forms of settlement. Adjudicative methods are those involving
a neutral third party who resolves the issue by rendering a de-
cision that is binding on the parties. In contrast, the diplo-
matic forms of dispute settlement, some of which involve a
third party, result in outcomes that are always non-binding in
effect. The fulfillment of any proposed solution depends upon
the mutual agreement of the disputants on its implementation.
There are two adjudicative methods of dispute resolution:
judicial settlement and arbitration. Judicial settlement can be
defined in general terms as the provision of a legally-binding
decision emanating from an impartial, formal, and permanent
tribunal. Forms of judicial settlement on the international
plane have been established pursuant to treaty and mainly
limit access to states.5
When a dispute between entities engaged in trans-border
activities occurs, the entities can attempt to resolve the dispute
through adjudication in the domestic courts of a state. How-
ever, various disadvantages associated with the judicial settle-
ment of international business disputes have led private enti-
3. This Article will not address the burgeoning field of alternative dispute reso-
lution of domestic disputes in Western legal systems. There is a growing body of
literature on the subject. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1985 & Supp. 1987); A Colloquy: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Interna-
tional Trade and Business, 40 ME. L. REV. 225, 258 (1988) (selective bibliography on
alternative dispute resolution). But see Galanter, Reading The Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know And Don't Know (And Think We Know) Abotit Our Allegedly Contentious And
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (effectively stating that litigation is actually "alter-
native," since most disputes are resolved either before legal action taken or before
trial).
4. See infra notes 177-212 and accompanying text (discussing various Pacific Rim
legal systems and their use of conciliation).
5. J. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTE SETrLEMENT 93 (1984); seeJUDICIAL SET-
TLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPuTES (Mosler & Bernhardt eds. 1974).
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ties to favour alternative means of dispute resolution where
feasible, with arbitration being the preferred option.6
Arbitration is also an adjudicative mode of dispute resolu-
tion since it results in the issue of a binding decision by a neu-
tral third party, the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal. However, it
differs from judicial settlement because the disputants can
structure the features of the arbitral process themselves rather
than facing a preset framework." Arbitration is a mode of dis-
pute resolution that is used throughout the transnational sys-
tem by states, international organizations, and private actors.
Diplomatic or political means of dispute settlement are
frequently utilized in the international system. Despite the. de-
ceptive nature of the title, they are used to solve disputes af-
fecting the legal position of the parties.' The attributes com-
mon to all the diplomatic methods are that the determination
of the conflict will usually require a compromise between the
parties and the final settlement is of a non-binding character.9
Diplomatic modes of settlement can be divided into two
branches: those that involve only the disputants themselves
and those that engage a third party to facilitate a resolution of
the conflict. Negotiations and consultations are the main cate-
gories of diplomatic settlement that are conducted by the dis-
putants alone. They are implemented at the outset of the reso-
lution process due to their ease of initiation and conduct, in-
formality, and privacy.' The next level of diplomatic dispute
settlement involves the intervention of a third party in the pro-
cess on the behest of or with the consent of the disputants.
The various methods of third party implication can be differen-
tiated on the basis of the degree of involvement and initiative
of the intervenor. Good offices, inquiry, mediation, and con-
ciliation are the major alternatives.
In inter-state conflict, the "good offices" of a person in a
position of authority and prestige is occasionally resorted to.
6. See generally D.F. Vagts, Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in International Business,
203 REC. COURS 9 (1987).
7. J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 70.
8. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes,
180 REC. COURS 169, 177 (1983).
9. Id.
10. J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 6-7; Lachs, International Law, Mediation and Nego-
tiation, in MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION: INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS
183 (A.S. Lall ed. 1985).
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The third party performing this function merely facilitates
communications between the states or attempts to persuade
them to restart negotiations." An inquiry may be the appro-
priate avenue for resolution of a conflict that stems from un-
certainty or disagreement over the relevant facts. A commis-
sion of inquiry can be constituted to ascertain objectively the
facts in dispute.' 2 It is anticipated that the report of the in-
dependent inquiry will lead to a settlement between the par-
ties. In a broader sense, inquiry into the facts is an integral
part of all varieties of third party dispute resolution.13
Mediation is another method of third party dispute settle-
ment used throughout the transnational system. A mediator
plays a more substantial role in the process, empowered not
only to construe and transmit communications between the
disputants but also to forward informal proposals for settle-
ment. 14 There is a marked similarity between mediation and
conciliation.
II. INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION DEFINED
International conciliation, the diplomatic mode of dispute
settlement in which the third party conciliator or conciliation
commission has the most pronounced effect on the process,
has been defined by the author Cot as:
[I]ntervention in the settlement of an international dispute
by a body having no political authority of its own, but en-
joying the confidence of the parties to the dispute and en-
trusted with the task of investigating every aspect of the dis-
pute and of proposing a solution which is not binding on
the parties.' 5
11. J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 20.
12. N. BAR-YAACOV, THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF
INQUIRY (1974).
13. Id. at 2-3.
14. J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 20; V. UMBRICHT, MULTILATERAL MEDIATION:
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 24 (1989). But see Bilder, International Third
Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471, 481 (1989).
15. J. COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 9 (1968) (trans. Myers 1972). In con-
trast, conciliation in some domestic systems has a less formal structure-the concilia-
tor promotes interaction between the parties but does not pose a solution. See Dress,
International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation, 10 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569,
574 (1988). However, the ombudsman institution and the mini-trial, a new form of
alternate dispute resolution, are conciliatory in nature.
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Although the definition was made in the context of inter-
national conciliation between states, it may be applied equally
to international conciliations involving non-state entities. Mr.
Cot identifies the core aspects of the conciliation process as
follows: (1) the conciliator (or conciliation commission) must
have the confidence of the disputants in order to be able to
perform her function; (2) the function of the conciliator is to
examine the entire dispute, including clarification of the facts
and a survey of both the applicable law and the non-juridical
elements; (3) the recommendations of the conciliator need not
be based purely on the application of law. The relevant legal
principles may be supplementary grounds or may be absent al-
together; and (4) the resolution proposed by the conciliator is
not binding on the disputants, who can refuse to implement
the recommendations.' 6
Conciliation has been used to resolve disputes on ques-
tions of law, the relevant facts, or a combination of both. It can
be utilized in the settlement of disputes that involve "non-arbi-
trable" or "non-justiciable" issues and is generally not hin-
dered by jurisdictional challenges.' 7 Conciliation is used, even
when there are relevant sources of law that can be applied, be-
cause the disputants may wish to soften the impact of the legal
principles concerned by implementing a conciliatory approach
that focuses on reaching an equitable solution. Conciliators
are given flexibility in the pursuit of a just result and, although
certain laws and sources of obligation cannot be disregarded,
extant conciliation rules reflect this relative freedom.' 8
Although conciliation has been used in some domestic so-
cieties for hundreds of years, on the international level it ap-
peared in the early part of this century, evolving out of both
16. J. COT, supra note 15, at 9-10.
17. I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES: A
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 7-8 (1986); see Report of the Secretary-General: Commentary on the Re-
vised Draft UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/180 [hereinafter U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/180].
18. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/180, supra note 17; see also UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules, Report of 13th Session, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/34/
17 (1980), art. 7(2), G.A. Res. 35/52, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 260, U.N.
Doc. A/35/48 (1980) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules]; International
Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 5, ICC Pub. No. 447
(1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 231, 235 (1989) [hereinafter ICC Conciliation Rules].
1990-1991]
584 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:578
the inquiry and mediation processes.' 9 Further, in the early
years of its use, conciliation was implemented together with in-
quiry as a two-step procedure where, initially, the facts in-
volved in the dispute were ascertained, followed by a reconcili-
ation phase. 20 As the practice of conciliation was refined, the
two concepts merged so that it can be derived from the general
definition of conciliation that, in an examination of the entire
dispute, an elucidation of the facts by the conciliator is an inte-
gral element of the process.2'
As noted, the concept of conciliation stemmed from and
resembles mediation, with both methods using a third party to
facilitate a non-binding result through the medium of commu-
nication with the disputants. Indeed, the two terms are occa-
sionally used interchangeably. In the transnational system, a
distinction between the two can be made in the degree of for-
mality and level of initiative imposed on the third party. A me-
diation is more informal and the mediator, when making pro-
posals, is expected to construct them based purely on the in-
formation provided by the parties. Comparatively, a
conciliation is more formal in structure and procedure, yet re-
tains a non-adversarial environment. The central objective of
the conciliator is to facilitate an amicable settlement of the
conflict by communicating with the parties, typically through
structured conciliation proceedings, and by submitting written
proposals for a resolution of the dispute. When conciliation is
resorted to in name, however, the actual process that is utilized
may be sometimes more akin to mediation than to conciliation
as defined above.22 In reality, as the use of the conciliation
process throughout the transnational system is surveyed, it is
evident that variations on the theme of conciliation flourish.
Resort to conciliation can be accomplished in two ways.
19. See, e.g., Herrmann, Conciliation as a New Method of Dispute Settlement, in NEW
TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
ROLE OF ARBrrRAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 145 (P. Sanders ed. 1983) (e.g. China
and Japan); Marasinghe, The Use of Conciliation For Dispute Settlement-The Sri Lanka
Experience, 29 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 389 (1980); N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 12, at 198
(discussing principle in international terms).
20. N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 12, at 198-211.
21. Id. at 241-46.
22. Report of the Secretary-General: Conciliation of International Trade Disputes, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/167; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing differing na-
ture of conciliation on domestic level).
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The parties can insert a conciliation clause into a treaty or con-
tract; thus, any future conciliation would address disputes aris-
ing out of that particular relationship. Alternatively, the par-
ties may consent to a discrete conciliation agreement which
will usually address a specific dispute that has arisen.
The concept of party autonomy governs the constitution
of each conciliation. By their agreement, the parties can deter-
mine the entire personality of the conciliation process: the
number and identity of the conciliators, the extent of concilia-
tor duties, and all aspects of the procedure. For conciliations
involving international business disputes, the parties can avoid
the uncertainties involved in designing their own rules by
agreeing that the process will be governed by institutional
rules-such as the International Chamber of Commerce Con-
ciliation Rules23 or the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Conciliation Rules.2 4
In essence, the conciliation process commences with the
appointment of the conciliator (or commission). The concilia-
tor will decide upon the format of the conciliation process, act-
ing in accordance with any rules that the parties have agreed
upon. Investigation into the facts and the law will be under-
taken by the conciliator, and both written and oral submissions
from the parties' agents will usually be presented. The concili-
ator may attempt to facilitate an amicable settlement during
the process and, in any event, will be clarifying the parties' po-
sitions and eliciting indications of their inclination to reach a
settlement. Ultimately, the conciliator will record his recom-
mendations in a report that will be provided to the dispu-
tants.2 5 A common practice, due to the non-binding nature of
the proposals, is to give the report to the disputants for a pe-
riod of time within which they must decide whether they can
accept the recommendations or not.2 6 If the disputants agree
to accept the recommendations, the conciliator will draft a
document, often referred to as the procds-verbal, which indicates
that the conciliation has been successful and outlines the terms
of the agreement. 7 Alternatively, if either party rejects the
23. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18.
24. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18.
25. J. COT, supra note 15, at 59.
26. J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 64.
27. Id.
1990-1991] 585
586 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:578
recommendations, the document will record the fact that the
parties could not accept the proposals, with the conciliation
dissolving at this point. If institutional rules are used, they
may refine or embellish the basic structure of the conciliation
process.
In contrast to judicial settlement, the entire procedure and
written record of the conciliation remains confidential unless
the parties agree otherwise. Invariably, it will be agreed that
all proposals and other statements made during the concilia-
tion cannot be used in any subsequent phase of the dispute
settlement process, but occasionally this can be departed from
upon the consent of the parties. 8
The cardinal feature of conciliation is the non-binding
character of the conciliator's recommendations. The actual
recommendations are not binding on the disputants because
they are ultimately free to accept or reject the recommenda-
tions. However, if a settlement agreement is made between
the parties based on these proposals, this agreement in and of
itself is binding.29
Realistically, it is likely that disputants will determine that
conciliation is not a viable mode of dispute settlement when
they consider that their positions are so polarized and antago-
nistic that any concession is impossible. Also, if the parties
wish to have their legal rights conclusively determined, then
arbitration or judicial settlement would be the more appropri-
ate alternatives. The engagement of the parties in the entire
process is possible only if they are willing to move from their
initial positions towards a mutually acceptable solution,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the conciliator's recom-
mendations will be implemented. Regular dialogue between
the conciliator and the parties will generate even greater confi-
dence in both the third party and the process.
The generous freedom of action residing with the dispu-
tants is also reflected in the initiation and conduct of the con-
ciliation process. Typically, resort to conciliation is structured
28. J. COT, supra note 15, at 161-62; ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art.
11; UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 20.
29. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/180, supra note 17, 6; UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules,
supra note 18, art. 13(3); ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 7(a). The parties
may include an arbitration clause in the settlement agreement in the event of a dis-
pute over its enforcement.
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as an optional procedure. Either disputant is generally able to
refuse to conciliate or can withdraw from the process even if a
conciliation clause or agreement exists.3 0 Thus, it is clear that
the continued willingness of the disputants to participate in the
conciliation procedure is essential for its ultimate completion.
Due to its character, conciliation is not always the sole vehicle
used to resolve a particular dispute. The proceedings may
break down or the conciliator's recommendations may be re-
jected. Consequently, another phase for settlement of the con-
flict is usually agreed upon, such as arbitration, to follow if the
conciliation attempt fails.
III. THE USE OF CONCILIATION AS A MECHANISM FOR
THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS DISPUTES
The transnational system abounds with variations on con-
ciliation as a method for the settlement of disputes arising out
of international economic and business relationships. In the
inter-state economic sphere, conciliation has been adopted for
use in resolving disputes between contracting parties within an
international organization or multilateral treaty framework.
Conciliation has also been inserted in bilateral agreements, in
particular those relating to trade or investment by one party in
the territory of the other. On the national level, conciliation
has been incorporated into domestic statutes regulating inter-
national commercial dispute settlement. Finally, in the private
sector, parties entering into international business contracts
can draft conciliation clauses into their agreements, utilizing
institutional conciliation rules if desired. Whether the frame-
work is a multilateral or bilateral treaty, domestic statute or
private ordering, conciliation usually serves as a preliminary or
intermediate step in a layered dispute resolution structure.
In the international economic sphere, conciliation is either
structured according to its traditional format, as discussed
above, or particular aspects of the concept are used. More-
over, conciliation is infrequently activated when a dispute does
arise, its availability notwithstanding.3 ' With some exceptions
30. I. DORE, supra note 17, at 6; seeJ. COT, supra note 15, at 102-03. The ICC and
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules reflect this freedom.
31. This situation is paralleled in the general inter-state system. SeeJ. COT, supra
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found in the realm of international trade, disputants appear to
prefer adjudicative, binding methods of dispute resolution.
However, there is some contemporary support for greater use
of conciliation and other non-binding forms of settlement.32
This Article does not attempt to provide an exhaustive survey
of the use of conciliation; rather, it will track, the conciliation
paradigm across the spectrum of transnational law to illustrate
the diversity of its application.
A. Conciliation as a Method for the Settlement of Disputes Arising
Out of Participation in an International Organization or a
Multilateral or Bilateral Treaty Regulating
International Economic Relations
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the Tokyo Round Codes, and the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
"GATT" or the "Agreement"), 33 as supplemented by the trea-
note 15, at 63-88;J. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 53-59; Mangoldt, Arbitration and Concil-
iation, in JUDICIAL SETrLEMEFT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 417, 432-87 (Max Planck
Institute 1974). In contrast to the inter-war years, in the post-World War II period
there has been a lack of interest in the procedure on a bilateral basis, the Jan Mayen
conciliation being a notable exception. See Report and Recommendations to the Gov-
ernments of Iceland and Norway of the Conciliation Commission on the Continental
Shelf Area Between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 797 (1981);
Agreement on the Continental Shelf (Iceland-Norway), October 22, 1981, reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982). Although there has been some interest in the use of concilia-
tion as a means for the settlement of conflict arising out of a multilateral treaty rela-
tionship, it is not being implemented. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 24, 1964, art. 3, 23 U.S.T. 3374, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 241;
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 66 and Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 284, 297-98, 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1983).
32. Bilder, supra note 14, at 498; Jarvin, The Role of Conciliation, Contract Modifica-
tion and Expert Appraisal in Settling International Commercial Disputes, 4 INT'L TAx & Bus.
LAW. 238, 240 (1986); see U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/180, supra note 17; infra note 124 and
accompanying text.
33. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See-generally J.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1989) [hereinafterJ. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; THE NEW
GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS (E.-U. Petersmann & M. Hilf eds. 1988) [hereinafter NEW GATr ROUND];
0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM
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ties known as the Tokyo Round Codes, 4 constitutes the inter-
national legal framework of the multilateral trade system. Di-
rected at the liberalization of international trade, the GATT
contains a dispute settlement mechanism that has evolved con-
siderably. Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT are the cen-
tral provisions, elaborated upon in the 1979 Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance (the "1979 Understanding"),35 and the 1982 Min-
isterial Declaration on Dispute Settlement (the "1982 Ministe-
rial Declaration"), 6 and refined in the Uruguay Round 1989
Provisional Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Rules and Procedures.
Article XXII provides for consultations with respect to any
matter affecting the operation of the Agreement. The article
XXIII procedure can be activated by a contracting party when
it considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under the Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being im-
peded. Again, pursuant to article XXIII: 1, the disputants must
enter into consultations. Only if the matter cannot be resolved
at this stage can the parties refer the matter to the contracting
(1987); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1970); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAT (1969); U.S. International
Trade Commission, Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement Under the GA T
and the Tokyo Round Agreements, USITC Publication 1793 (1985) [hereinafter ITC Re-
view].
34. See Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement, 34S
B.I.S.D. 12 (1988) [hereinafter Government Procurement Code]; Agreement on In-
terpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 26S B.I.S.D. 56 (1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; Agree-
ment on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 26S B.I.S.D. 171 (1980) [hereinafter Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement, 26S B.I.S.D. 33 (1980); Agreement on Implementation of Ar-
ticle VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 26S B.I.S.D. 116 (1980)
[hereinafter Customs Valuation Code]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
26S B.I.S.D. 8 (1980) [hereinafter Standards Code]; Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures, 26S B.I.S.D. 154 (1980); Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, 26S
B.I.S.D. 162 (1980); International Dairy Arrangement, 26S B.I.S.D. 91 (1980); Ar-
rangement Regarding Bovine Meat, 26S B.I.S.D. 84 (1980).
35. Adopted on Nov. 28, 1979, 26S B.I.S.D. 210 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 Un-
derstanding].
36. GATT, 29S B.I.S.D. 13 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Ministerial Declaration].
37. MTN.TNC/I 1 at 24-31 (Apr. 21, 1989), reprinted in 1 no. 4 W.T.M. 5 (1989)
[hereinafter Uruguay Round Provisional Decision]. It will be applied on a trial basis
from May 1, 1989 to the end of the Uruguay Round. Id. at 24.
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parties under article XXIII:2.-8
Article XXIII:2 provides that the contracting parties shall
promptly investigate any matter referred to them and shall
make appropriate recommendations to the relevant con-
tracting parties or give a ruling on the matter. A structured
dispute settlement process has developed through GATF
practice. A hybrid of conciliation and good offices is an op-
tional procedure for use at an early stage in the process. Para-
graph 8 of the 1979 Understanding states that "[i]f a dispute is
not resolved through consultations the contracting parties
concerned may request an appropriate body or individual to
use their good offices with a view to the conciliation of the out-
standing differences between the parties. '" 9 The 1982 Minis-
terial Declaration elaborated on the conciliatory aspect of par-
agraph 8 of the 1979 Understanding by adding elements of the
classic conciliation procedure.4 °
The Uruguay Round Provisional Decision (the "Provi-
sional Decision") considerably expands the use of good offices,
conciliation, and mediation by disputing parties, providing de-
tailed rules for their use. 41 The Provisional Decision stipulates
38. "Contracting Parties" connotes the GATT parties acting jointly pursuant to
their GAIT decision-making powers, whereas "contracting party/parties" refers to
GATT parties acting individually. The Contracting Parties have delegated most of
their powers to the Council of Representatives.
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing 1979 Understanding).
40. See 1982 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 36, at 14. The GATT Director-
General or nominee shall conduct the conciliation and the proceedings shall be con-
fidential and without prejudice to other article XXIII proceedings. See GAT', 14S
B.I.S.D. 18 (1966) (decision of Apr. 5, 1966) (discussing conciliation procedures for
disputes between contracting parties from developed and lesser-developed coun-
tries).
41. Uruguay Round Provisional Decision, supra note 37, at 26. The decision, in
relevant part, states that:
1. Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are under-
taken voluntarily if the parties to the dispute so agree. They may be re-
quested at any time by any party to a dispute. They may begin at any time
and be terminated at any time. Once terminated, the complaining party can
then proceed with a request for the establishment of a panel or a working
party under Article XXIII:2 ....
2. If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation
or mediation may continue while the panel or working party process pro-
ceeds.
3. The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer his good
offices, conciliation or mediation with a view to assisting contracting parties
to settle a dispute.
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that with party agreement these processes can be started "at
any time" and can, if the parties further agree, continue while
the panel (or working party) phase proceeds.4 2
If the dispute continues despite consultations and any spe-
cific resort to conciliation, the parties may request the estab-
lishment of a panel
to examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions,
the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES ...
and to make such findings as will assist the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or
in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2.4 s
The constitution and powers of the panel are similar to those
of a conciliatory body: the panel cannot be composed of per-
sons who are nationals of the disputing parties and the mem-
bers must act in their personal capacities. Panels have been
given the authority to formulate draft recommendations ad-
dressed to the disputing parties.44 Even at the point when the
final panel report is completed, a further attempt is made to
conciliate a settlement through the private submission of the
report to the parties.45 The panel report has no legal status
until it is adopted by the contracting parties, acting through
the GATT Council of Representatives (the "Council") which
operates by consensus. 46 Further, the disputing parties will be
represented on the Council and are permitted to participate in
the adoption process, which permits a disputant to block the
adoption of the report if it desires to do so. 47 An analysis of
Id.
42. Id. 1 & 2.
43. Id. at 27, 1. Although a working party alternative is available, it will not be
discussed further as the panel procedure has become the favoured mechanism.
44. 1979 Understanding, supra note 35, 11 & 17, annex, 6(iii) & (viii).
There has been debate in the literature on the nature of the panel process. See, e.g.,
Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, in NEw GATT ROUND,
supra note 33, at 304-05 ("GATT panel procedures may be best compared to proce-
dures of conciliation"). But see Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement
System: On The Use of Arbitration in GATT, in NEw GATT ROUND, supra note 33, at 335;
McGovern, Dispute Settlement in the GATT-Adjudication or Negotiation?, in THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 73 (M. Hilf, F. Jacobs & E.-U. Petersmann eds. 1986).
45. 1979 Understanding, supra note 35, 18.
46. 1982 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 36, at (vii) & (x); Uruguay Round
Provisional Decision, supra note 37, at 30.
47. 1982 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 36, art. (x), at 15-16; Uruguay
Round Provisional Decision, supra note 37, at 30.
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the history of GAT[ dispute resolution has found that,
although many disputes are settled through diplomatic means
before the panel stage, more than half of the complaints
lodged in forty years of GAIT activity resulted in the submis-
sion of a panel report.48 Most of the panel reports put before
the Council have been adopted; however, delay has been a par-
ticular problem.49
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism incorporates
variants of conciliation throughout the process.5 Conciliation
may be used in its more classic sense, albeit informally, at the
early stages of the dispute resolution stream. With the formu-
lation of the specific conciliation provisions in the Provisional
Decision, the inclination to attempt conciliation at this phase
will be promoted and heighten the potential for early settle-
ment of the conflict. The panel-Council procedure can be de-
scribed as being similar to conciliation in some aspects,
although the conciliatory elements are attenuated. The panel
will usually make recommendations to solve the dispute which
will only be adopted by the Council if there is a consensus in
favour thereof. Even if the report is adopted, pursuant to arti-
cle XXIII:2 the final outcome may be technically only recom-
mendatory in nature if a ruling is not given.'
48. GATT, 46 Focus 2 (1987). A GATT survey covering 1948-1986 found that
of the approximately one hundred complaints lodged under article XXIII:2, fifty-two
led to the submission of a panel report whereas the remainder were settled prior to
this stage. Of the fifty-two reports, fifty were adopted or led to mutually satisfactory
solutions together with a withdrawal of the complaint. In only two disputes were the
reports unsuccessful in attaining dispute resolution. Id.
49. Id.; see Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 51, 83-85
(1987).
50. See 0. LONG, supra note 33, at 73, 76, 86-88; Graham, A Review of Considera-
tions Relating to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Trade in Services, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS AND TRADE LAw PROGRAMME OF THE ONTARIO CENTRE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS, WORKING PAPER No. 3, 7, 12-13 (1988-89).
51. Cf. Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques Between Nations Concerning Economic Re-
lations-With Emphasis on GA TT, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH IN-
TERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 39, 50 n.29 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984). ProfessorJackson
stated that
[n]either Article XXIII of GATr... nor the Understanding Regarding Noti-
fication, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance . . . explicitly
requires a party to a dispute to abide by the results of a panel report, even
when the panel report is adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties. Article
XXV of GATT ... does authorize the Contracting Parties to take "joint
action" as required under the GATT, or otherwise "with a view to facilitat-
ing the operation and furthering the objectives of [the GAIT]." It could be
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However, various elements of the GATT panel procedure
diverge from the conciliation model when compared to Mr.
Cot's identified characteristics of the conciliation process. A
GATT panel also exhibits certain features of an adjudicative
body. Although a panel does have the confidence of the dispu-
tants, the procedure followed differs in some aspects from the
classic conciliation process. The panel does examine the en-
tire dispute, but this exercise extends only to the facts and the
applicable law and does not include the non-juridical elements.
Furthermore, the reports of the panel are virtually always
based on GATT treaty law and earlier panel reports which
have interpreted GATT provisions. Moreover, although the
report is technically non-binding, the contracting parties con-
cerned rarely reject panel findings. Ultimately, article XXIII:2
departs from the consensual approach. The article permits
Contracting Parties indirectly to enforce the recommendation
by authorizing the prejudiced party to suspend the application
of GATT concessions made to the other party. This sanction
has only been authorized once, however, which is indicative of
both the perceived detrimental consequences of trade retalia-
tion and the effect of the layered dispute resolution system,
which contains a number of opportunities for settlement of the
conflict.52
The conciliatory approach to settling disputes has been
continued in the treaties concluded at the end of the GATT
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (the "Tokyo
Round Codes"), which elaborate on specific aspects of the
GATT obligations." Many of these agreements create dispute
resolution frameworks that are independent of the article XX-
III process. In particular, the Subsidies Code and the An-
tidumping Code (the "Codes") contain mechanisms that incor-
porate a conciliatory stage as part of the settlement process.
Typically, if consultations between the disputing parties are
argued that this language is broad enough to embrace the concept that
panel reports adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties should be deemed
binding on the parties to the dispute.
Id; see Jackson, Strengthening The International Legal Framework of the GA TT-MTN System:
Reform Proposals for the New GATT Round, in NEw GATT RoUND, supra note 33, at 14.
52. GATT, IS B.I.S.D. 32 (1953); K. DAM, supra note 33, at 364. But see Davey,
supra note 49, at 99-100 (stating that retaliation has occurred without authorization
and de hors formal GATT dispute settlement system).
53. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing various trade codes).
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unproductive, the Codes provide for conciliation of the dis-
pute conducted by the Committee constituted under the par-
ticular agreement, followed, if necessary and requested by a
party, by panel proceedings. Generally, the panel will issue its
report to the GATT Code Committee (the "Committee")
which, in turn, will produce the findings, recommendations, or
rulings that it thinks necessary to determine the dispute.5 4
Again, some aspects of conciliation are apparent in the panel-
Committee procedure which is followed by a putative, institu-
tional enforcement mechanism as the final step.
The attitudes of contracting parties to the GATT system
can be classified as being either "legalistic"/"rule-oriented" or
"nonlegalistic"/"power-oriented". In the second camp, some
contracting parties prefer the flexible, diplomatic approach to
the enforcement of GAIT obligations as the most appropriate
means for the maintenance of international trade equilibrium,
whereas the legalists call for greater application of the rule of
law.55 Despite the increased reliance in GATT on legalistic ap-
proaches, Professor Castel concludes that diplomatic charac-
teristics in general and the conciliatory aspect in particular are
still predominant in the dispute settlement framework:
Today, in spite of the progressive codification of the basic
procedures for the settlement of disputes by third party ad-
judication, consultations and conciliation leading to an ami-
cable settlement through diplomatic negotiations are still
preferred by the contracting parties. Thus, the major char-
acteristic of the GATT system of settlement of disputes is
the conciliatory character of the procedures. The objective
is to redress the contractual balance of rights and obliga-
tions between the disputants in particular, and among the
54. Subsidies Code, supra note 34, arts. 13, 17 & 18; see Antidumping Code,
supra note 34, arts. 14 & 15. The Customs Valuation Code, the Standards Code, and
the Government Procurement Code, do not specifically authorize the use of concilia-
tion. Instead, if consultations are ineffective, they instruct the Code Committee "to
investigate the matter, with a view to facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution," a
mediatory approach. The Codes provide for further recourse to panel or technical
expert group/panel proceedings.
55. See Phan van Phi, A European View of the GATT, 14 I.B.L. 150, 151 (1986). The
EC is the main advocate of the diplomatic approach. But seeJ. JACKSON, WORLD TRAD-
ING SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 109-15 (advocating reliance on and strengthening of
legalist aspects of GATT settlement regime); see also Davey, supra note 49, at 53; ITC
Review, supra note 33.
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contracting parties in general.56
In this vein, the GATT adaptation of conciliation is a continu-
ing manifestation of the nonlegalist attitude-the attempt to
obtain the amicable resolution of disputes between contracting
parties, thereby maintaining the viability of the treaty relation-
ship-a pragmatic response to the limitations of the strict ap-
plication of law in the international trade system.
2. Free Trade Agreements
Article XXIV of the GATT permits the creation of free
trade agreements ("FTAs") in which members eliminate tariffs
and certain other trade barriers on goods crossing the intra-
FTA borders while retaining their independent legal regimes
for goods moving to and from other states. Numerous free
trade agreements have been created by GATT contracting par-
ties, and an examination of selected agreements demonstrates
that their dispute resolution provisions usually include varia-
tions of conciliation. Diverging from the norm, however, FTA
conciliatory bodies are not completely neutral, as they usually
include representatives from the FTA member states.
The European Free Trade Association (the "EFTA") 57 re-
lies on the conciliatory approach for the settlement of disputes
arising out of its operation, as found in articles 31 and 33 of
the EFTA Convention. Article 31(1) permits any member state
to refer a dispute to the EFTA Council which, on majority
vote, will examine the matter. The Council may refer the dis-
pute to an examining committee. Moreover, the Council is re-
quired to consider the report of the committee to determine
whether any benefit conferred by the EFTA Convention or any
EFTA objective is or may be frustrated. 58 Based on this re-
view, the EFTA Council "may, by majority vote, make to any
56. Castel, The Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement
Rules and Procedures, 38 I.C.L.Q. 834, 838-39 (1989); see 0. LONG, supra note 33, at 73,
76; J. JACKSON, WoRu TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 98 (detailing increased
emphasis on legalistic attitude in continuing amendments to dispute settlement pro-
cedure).
57. Currently, the countries that are Contracting Parties are: Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Convention Establishing the European
Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EFTA Conven-
tion]. See generally J. LAMBRINIDIS, THE STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND LAW OF A FREE
TRADE AREA (1965).
58. EFTA Convention, supra note 57, art. 31(3).
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Member State such recommendations as it considers appropri-
ate."'59 The EFTA Convention procedure roughly parallels the
GATT at the final stage, since the EFTA Council can authorize
any member state to suspend the application of obligations
under the EFTA Convention against the state that does not
comply with a recommendation if the EFTA Council, by major-
ity decision, finds that a Convention obligation has not been
fulfilled.60 So, similar to GATT article XXIII, the EFTA Coun-
cil recommendation, although definitionally non-binding, can
be ultimately enforced by means of the threat of a sanctioning
decision if there has been a breach of the EFTA Convention. 61
There are also free trade agreements in place between in-
dividual EFTA states and the European Economic Community
(the "EC" or the "Community"), each of which establish a
Joint Committee responsible for the administration and proper
implementation of the agreement.6 2 Each agreement contains
the same dispute resolution structure wherein the Joint Com-
mittee, composed of representatives of both the Community
and the particular EFTA state, is empowered to make recom-
mendations or take decisions in the settlement of the disputes
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 31(4).
61. SeeJ. LAMBRINIDIS, supra note 57, at 219-20. Mr. Lambrinidis draws a dis-
tinction between the GAIT and the EFFA Convention at this stage, stating that
GATT provides for similar measures, that is suspension of concessions (Ar-
ticle XXIII) even in the absence of a breach of treaty. In EFTA, the line
between the two cases is clearly drawn. In cases where a breach of treaty has
not been established, the most that the Council can do is to issue Recom-
mendations.
Id.
62. Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Republic
of Austria, July 22, 1972, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Vol. B II, B12369, arts. 27, 29 & 30 (K.R. Simmonds ed. looseleaf 1973) [hereinafter
ENCYCLOPEDIA II]; Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the
Kingdom of Sweden,July 22, 1972, ENCYCLOPEDIA II, supra, at B12401, arts. 27, 29 &
30; Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confed-
eration, July 22, 1972, ENCYCLOPEDIA II, supra, at B12430, arts. 27, 29 & 30; Agree-
ment Between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, July
22, 1972, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw Vol. B III,
B12462, arts. 28, 30 & 31 (K.R. Simmonds ed. looseleaf 1973) [hereinafter ENCYCLO-
PEDIA III]; Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the King-
dom of Norway, May 14, 1973, ENCYCLOPEDIA III, supra, at B12474, arts. 27, 29 & 30;
Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Fin-
land, Oct. 5, 1973, ENCYCLOPEDIA III, supra, at B12474, arts. 27, 29 & 30.
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specified in the particular treaty.6"
The 1984 U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement 64 is an exam-
ple of state reliance on purely non-binding forms of dispute
resolution, primarily conciliation in this instance, for conflicts
arising out of the treaty relationship. Article 19 contains the
dispute resolution process: the first phase involves consulta-
tions between the parties and, if unsuccessful, the second stage
permits either party to refer the matter to a Joint Committee
that is instructed to endeavour to resolve the dispute.65 If the
conflict is not resolved by this method within the stated time
period, article 19(1)(d) allows either party to refer the matter
to a conciliation panel composed of three members. The con-
ciliation procedure follows the classical model, with the panel
attempting to solve the dispute through party agreement dur-
ing the process and, if unsuccessful, presenting to the parties a
report that is non-binding and contains, inter alia, findings of
fact and a proposal on the settlement of the dispute.66 The
informal, diplomatic nature of the process is illustrated by the
fact that the report is not passed back to the Joint Committee
for further action. Instead, individual action is envisaged be-
cause, after the conciliation panel has presented its report to
the parties, article 19(2) permits the affected party to take any
appropriate measure. The conciliatory process can therefore
be followed by authorized unilateral action taken to realize the
panel proposals-an outcome that departs from the consen-
sual nature of conciliation.
It is apparent that the dispute resolution structures in the
free trade agreements are founded on the attitude that the
political/diplomatic forms of settlement are often more appro-
priate than the adjudicative approach for maintaining interna-
63. Id.
64. United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985)
[hereinafter U.S.-Israel F.T.A.]. See generally James, The Agreement on Establishment of a
Free Trade Area Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Israel: Background and Analysis, in THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA-UNITED STATES
TRADE 121 (M. Irish & E. Carasco eds. 1987). But see The Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, art. 22, 1983 N.Z.T.S.
No. 1, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 945 (1983) [hereinafter Australia-New Zealand Agree-
ment] (providing only inter-governmental consultations to facilitate dispute resolu-
tion).
65. U.S.-Israel F.T.A., supra note 64, arts. 17, 19(1)(b) & (c) (Joint Committee
composed of representatives of parties).
66. Id. art. 19(l)(e).
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tional free trade relationships, notwithstanding that the inter-
ests of the contracting parties are likely to be more similar than
is the case with the global, membership of the GATT system.
Thus, although these agreements exhibit both the diplomatic
and the adjudicative approaches to dispute resolution, the dip-
lomatic chord dominates.
More recently, the Canada-United States Free-Trade
Agreement (the "Canada-U.S. FTA")6 7 exhibits a dispute reso-
lution framework that incorporates legalistic aspects to a
greater and more sophisticated degree compared to the earlier
FTA models. The Canada-U.S. FTA framework has also been
considered to be more legalistic in structure than its GATT
relation. 68 However, analyses of chapters 18 and 19, the prin-
cipal dispute settlement mechanisms in the Canada-U.S. FTA,
recognize that the diplomatic modes of conflict resolution still
play a leading role.6 9
Chapter 19 of the Canada-U.S. FTA is the exception,
structured as a fully adjudicative model.70 It contains a proce-
dure for binational panel review of the final antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations of both states, replacing
domestic judicial review. 7' The panel decision is binding on
the parties and cannot be subjected to judicial appeal in the
domestic courts of either party.72
Chapter 18, on the other hand, is the general dispute set-
67. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, entered into force, Jan. 2,
1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA].
68. See, e.g., Horlick, Oliver and Steger, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, in THE
CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 65, 73-75 (J.
Schott & M. Smith eds. 1988); Davey, Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 173 (M. Gold & D. Leyton-Brown eds. 1988). However, the GATT Uru-
guay Round Provisional Decision has made some interim changes to the article XXIII
procedure that are legalistic in character, such as putting time limits on the process
and creating a binding arbitration procedure as an alternative to the panel. GAIT
Uruguay Round Provisional Decision, supra note 37.
69. See McDorman, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2
R.I.B.L. 303 (1988); Ferguson, Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 47 U. OF T. FAC. OF LAW REV. 317 (1989).
70. McDorman, supra note 69, at 323.
71. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, arts. 1904(1) & (3).
72. Id. arts. 1904(9) & (11). Article 1904(13) and Annex 1904.13 do provide for
an extraordinary challenge procedure to contest the panel decision on grounds of,
inter alia, panel member conflict of interest and exceeding jurisdiction. Id. art.
1904(13) & annex 1904.13.
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tlement mechanism for the Canada-U.S. FTA. It is very similar
to the GATT article XXIII procedure, as it is also a multiphase
system that relies both on diplomatic and adjudicative forms of
conflict resolution with the nonlegalistic elements taking the
predominant position. Further, the conciliation model,
although it is not expressly referred to in Chapter 18, is actu-
ally utilized in the resolution machinery.73
The Chapter 18 procedure is composed of escalating
phases, starting with a notification requirement,74 moving to a
consultations stage,75 and proceeding to a convening of the
Canada-United States Trade Commission (the "Canada-U.S.
Commission") at the request of either party if consultations
are ineffective. 76 The Canada-U.S. Commission was created,
inter alia, to assist in the resolution of disputes arising out of
the Canada-U.S. FTA.77 Composed of representatives of both
parties, its principal members are the Canadian and U.S. cabi-
net-level ministers with the responsibility for international
trade, and all its decisions are taken by consensus. 8 In effect,
the Canada-U.S. Commission acts as a political mechanism for
the settlement of Chapter 18 disputes. Article 1805(1) in-
structs the Canada-U.S. Commission to attempt to resolve dis-
putes promptly. In an effort to reach a mutually satisfactory
resolution, the Canada-U.S. Commission is empowered, pur-
suant to article 1805(2), to call on technical advisors or on the
assistance of a mediator acceptable to both parties.
If the Canada-U.S. Commission is unable to achieve reso-
lution of the dispute within thirty days after its referral under
article 1805, then article 1806 instructs the Canada-U.S. Com-
mission on the referral of disputes to binding arbitration. Dis-
putes arising out of emergency actions taken under Chapter 11
of the Canada-U.S. FTA shall be referred to mandatory binding
arbitration, and any other Chapter 18 dispute may be referred
to binding arbitration by the Canada-U.S. Commission. 79 The
alternative route for dispute settlement, if article 1806 arbitra-
73. See Ferguson, supra note 69, at 347.
74. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 67, art. 1803.
75. Id. art. 1804.
76. Id. art. 1805(1).
77. d. arts. 1802(1), 1806 & 1807.
78. Id. arts. 1802(2) & (5).
79. Id. art. 1806(1)(a) & (b).
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tion is not implemented, is the establishment upon the request
of either party of a panel of experts to consider the matter.8"
The panel issues an initial and final report containing: findings
of fact, a determination whether the measure at issue is incon-
sistent with FTA obligations or causes nullification and impair-
ment, and recommendations, if 'any, for resolving the dis-
pute. 8' Article 1807(8) specifies that the Canada-U.S. Com-
mission, upon receipt of the final panel report, shall agree on
the resolution of the dispute "which normally shall conform
with the recommendation of the panel. '" 82 If the Canada-U.S.
Commission cannot reach agreement within the stated time,
article 1807(9) permits retaliation by the party who feels that
its fundamental rights or benefits are or would be impaired by
the maintenance of the measure.
This panel-Commission procedure is clearly conciliatory
in tone and is closely reminiscent of the GATT article XXIII
panel process. The Canada-U.S. FTA panel of experts, despite
its U.S. and Canadian membership, is expected to act as an
impartial third party, providing recommendations in an effort
to resolve the conflict. The recommendations of the panel can
only be accepted with the consent of the disputants. Here, dis-
putant agreement is attempted through the medium of the
Canada-U.S. Commission and, if unsuccessful, the ultimate
remedy is authorized unilateral action. However, as with the
GAIT panel, the FTA panel of experts diverges from the clas-
sic conciliation body towards the adjudicative model. A panel
of experts is unlikely to examine non-juridical aspects of the
conflict, instead confining itself to the relevant facts and law.
In addition, based on GATT and Canada-U.S. FTA panel ex-
perience, any recommendations of the FTA panel will be based
on the applicable legal principles, although there is still room
for creative recommendations within the confines of the gov-
erning treaty-law. Returning to the conciliation paradigm, the
FTA sends the dispute to the Canada-U.S. Commission for
80. Id. art. 1807(2). Each panel is composed of five members, at least two of
whom shall be Canadian citizens and at least two of whom shall be U.S. citizens.
However, the panelists are to be chosen strictly on the basis of, inter alia, objectivity
and sound judgment and shall not be affiliated with or take instructions from either
party. Id. art. 1807(1).
81. Id. arts. 1807(5) & (6).
82. Id. art. 1807(8).
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agreement on its resolution, which normally shall, but im-
pliedly does not have to, conform with the recommendations
of the panel. It remains for future analysis whether the Can-
ada-U.S. Commission's article 1807(8) agreements will consist-
ently conform with the recommendations of each panel,
thereby adopting an adjudicative approach to the process, or
whether the agreements will occasionally differ from the panel
recommendations, indicative of an approach that is more in
harmony with the conciliation model. In effect, the panel of
experts procedure in the Canada-U.S. FTA is a variant form of
conciliation that is attenuated due to its position in a relatively
complex conflict settlement structure.
The political influence in the panel of experts-Commis-
sion route has been illustrated in the first Chapter 18 dispute,
In The Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement For Pacific Coast
Salmon and Herring.83 The Canada-U.S. Commission was un-
able to agree upon a resolution of the dispute within the time-
line specified in article 1807(9) due to differing interpretations
of the panel report submitted to it. 4 The parties agreed to
extend the time for negotiation, and a compromise solution
was reached in February 1990, the details of which only slightly
depart from the panel's recommendations.8 5 The resolution of
the dispute demonstrates, at least in this particular case, that
83. In The Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement For Pacific Coast Salmon and Her-
ring, Panel Final Report, October 16, 1989, CDA-89-1807-01; see Lobsters From Canada,
Panel Final Report, May 25, 1990, USA-89-1807-01 [hereinafter Second Panel Re-
port]. The second panel addressed the Canadian complaint that the amendment to
the U.S. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, prohibiting the sale
or transport into or in the United States of undersized lobster, violated U.S. obliga-
tions under art. 407 of the Canada-U.S. FTA. Second Panel Report, supra, at 18,
4.1.1.1. The view of the panel as represented by the majority was that GATT article
XI (treated as incorporated in the Canada-U.S. FTA article 407) was inapplicable.
Second Panel Report, supra, at 40-71. Instead, the panel was of the opinion that the
U.S. measures were covered by GATT article II. The panel declined to examine the
consistency of the U.S. measure with article III on the grounds that their terms of
reference did not permit such a consideration. Second Panel Report, supra, at 70-71,
7.22.2. The panel did not make any recommendations.
84. The Free Trade Observer, in FREE TRADE LAw REPORTER (CCH) 30 (Dec. 1989).
85. Government of Canada, News Release No. 038, February 22, 1990 (copy on
file at the Fordham International Law Journal office). The agreement is slightly different
from the panel recommendations on the percentage of the catch that should be di-
rectly exported without landing in Canada in order to satisfy the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources justification for the landing restriction. The panel had
suggested that ten to twenty percent should be directly exported, whereas the parties
have agreed, with effect for four years, on twenty to twenty-five percent.
1990-1991]
602 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:578
the conciliatory approach of the panel of experts-Commission
procedure works, albeit not in the manner anticipated by the
precise language of the Canada-U.S. FTA. However, the par-
ties, in providing the Canada-U.S. Commission with the oppor-
tunity to disregard any recommendations made by a panel in
accordance with the conciliation paradigm, have established a
structure that will not guarantee certainty of results or dispute
resolution within a specified period. In a particular situation
there may be compromise, deadlock or disagreement, and any
of these possibilities may also be encouraged by both the na-
ture of the dispute and the content of the recommendations
posed by the panel.
The emphasis on conciliation in the GATT and free trade
agreements, treaties wherein states have strictly circumscribed
the limitations on their sovereignty in the economic sphere,
can be contrasted with the dispute settlement system employed
by the European Community. As a supranational organization
designed to build a common market and moving towards eco-
nomic union, it has a multiplicity of sources of Community
law.8" The legalistic approach is ascendant in this treaty rela-
tionship wherein the member states have consented to be
bound by Community law, including the power given to the
Court ofJustice of the European Communities (the "European
Court ofJustice") to ensure that the law is observed in the in-
terpretation and application of EC law.87
3. The Use of Conciliation in Other Trade-Related Treaties
Conciliation as a means for the avoidance or resolution of
conflict arising out of a treaty relationship can be found in a
variety of other trade-related agreements. These include the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(the "OECD")88 and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD"), where conciliation is used as
a dispute avoidance technique.89
86. See generally D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, LAW AND INTSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987).
87. Id. at 135.
88. OECD, Revised Council Recommendation Concerning Co-operation Be-
tween Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International
Trade, adopted on May 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986).
89. In the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), concilia-
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4. International Organizations Governing Finance and
Development
The international organizations in the international fi-
nance and development field make use of a variety of mecha-
nisms for the settlement of internal disputes. Most of these
organizations-the International Monetary Fund, the Interna-
tional Bank For Reconstruction and Development (the "World
Bank"), the International Development Association, and the
International Finance Corporation-do not use conciliation,
relying instead on methods ranging from collaboration and
consultation to arbitration.90 Two of the World Bank group of
international organizations, however, do include conciliation
as a mechanism for the settlement of internal disputes: the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (the "MIGA") 9'
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (the "ICSID" or the "Centre"). 92  In these organiza-
tions, conciliation takes its traditional form as a discrete alter-
native for the settlement of disputes arising out of a treaty rela-
tionship.
The MIGA was established to provide political risk guar-
antees for investors of state members who wish to invest in the
developing state members. The creation of a dispute settle-
tion is incorporated as a preliminary step before voting occurs to avoid conflicting
positions. G.A. Res. 1995 (XIX), Dec. 30, 1964, G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 15), art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/5815. Article 25 provides for a "process of
conciliation to take place before voting and to provide an adequate basis for the
adoption of recommendations with regard to proposals of a specific nature for action
substantially affecting the economic or financial interests of particular countries." Id.
art. 25.
90. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, as
amended, 29 U.S.T. 2204; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Recon-
struction and Development, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, [1944] Can. T.S. No. 37, at 47; Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, May 25, 1955, 264 U.N.T.S. 118; International Develop-
ment Association, 439 U.N.T.S. 249. But see several conciliations dealing with inter-
national finance issues, Imperial Japanese Government 4% Loan of 1910 Issued in
France - Methods of Resumption of Service, 29 I.L.R. 4 (1955); City of Tokyo 5%
Loan of 1912 - Plan For Resumption of Payments and Interest on the French Tranche
of the Loan, 29 I.L.R. 11 (1960).
91. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
Oct. 11, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985) [hereinafter MIGA Convention]; see
I. SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1988).
92. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [herein-
after ICSID Convention].
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ment structure to maintain harmonious relations between de-
veloped and developing state members was deemed essential.
Beyond the provisions dealing with specific categories of dis-
putes, 93 article 57 of the Convention Establishing the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency (the "MIGA Convention")
covers disputes between MIGA and its members and envisages
the use of a number of diplomatic methods of resolution, in-
cluding conciliation. 94 Claims made by MIGA, acting as subro-
gee of an investor, against a state member are to be settled,
pursuant to article 57(b), in accordance with either: (i) the An-
nex II procedure, or (ii) an alternative agreement. Pursuant to
article 57(a), any dispute between MIGA and a current or past
member, other than those processed elsewhere, shall be set-
tled in accordance with the Annex II procedure.
Annex II contains a two or three phase process for the res-
olution of article 57 disputes, using negotiation, then concilia-
tion and/or arbitration. Although negotiations must be con-
ducted in the first instance, conciliation is an optional proce-
dure prior to arbitration. 95 The Annex II procedure utilizes a
sole conciliator, provides for her appointment, and permits the
conciliator to determine the rules governing the conciliation
procedure unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties or
specified in the Annex.96 The conciliator's report, submitted
to the parties, must record the results of the conciliator's ef-
forts and set out the controversial issues and the conciliator's
proposals for settlement. The disputants are obligated to co-
operate in good faith with the conciliator, and to "give their
most serious consideration to his recommendations." 97 Due
to the recency of the entry into force of MIGA, it is still too
early to tell whether or not the conciliatory aspects of the
93. MIGA Convention, supra note 91, art. 44 (action initiated against MIGA in
the courts of member states for disputes other than those processed under arts. 57 &
58); id. art. 52 (suspension/expulsion of a member for nonfulfillment of treaty obliga-
tions); id. art. 56 (questions on the interpretation/application of the treaty); id. art. 58
(arbitration of disputes arising out of a contract of guarantee or reinsurance).
94. Id. art 57.
95. Id. annex II, arts. 2 & 3.
96. Id. annex II, art. 3(b) & (c). Article 3(c) states that the conciliator shall be
"guided" by the Conciliation Rules of the ICSID Convention. However, the concilia-
tor is under no duty to utilize the ICSID Rules. I. SHIHATA, supra note 91, at 266.
97. MIGA Convention, supra note 91, art. 3(d). Article 3(f) obligates each party
to express in writing its views on the report to the other within sixty days of receipt of
the report. Id. art. 3().
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MIGA dispute resolution system will be used on a regular ba-
sis. A comparison with the ICSID, which provides arbitration
and conciliation facilities, indicates that the conciliation alter-
native is underutilized-the clear preference of parties in-
volved in investment disputes is to move directly to arbitration.
In contrast to other international organizations, where dis-
pute settlement plays a supplementary role in the treaty rela-
tionship, the objective of ICSID is the settlement of investment
disputes by conciliation and/or arbitration.9" The jurisdiction
of the Centre extends
to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,
between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision
or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre
by that state) and a national of another Contracting State,
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit
to the Centre.99
Conciliation is treated as an optional form of ICSID dis-
pute resolution and, if used, can be structured as either an al-
ternative or preliminary to arbitration. The Centre provides a
roster of conciliators/arbitrators and has established Rules of
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration
Proceedings ("Institution Rules"), Rules of Procedure for
Conciliation Proceedings ("ICSID Conciliation Rules"), and
an Additional Facility to handle certain disputes that are other-
wise outside ICSID jurisdiction.100
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID
Convention") addresses the request for conciliation, the con-
stitution of the conciliation commission, and the subsequent
proceedings. The commission can consist of a sole conciliator
or any uneven number of conciliators appointed by party
agreement.' 0 ' The conciliation is to be conducted in accord-
98. ICSID Convention, supra note 92. There is a considerable body of literature
on the ICSID Convention and the ICSID. See generally Bibliography, 1 ICSID REV.-
F.I.L.J. 454 (1986); ICSID, ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS (ICSID/15 1985).
99. ICSID Convention, supra note 92, art. 25(1).
100. ICSID, BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note 98.
101. ICSID Convention, supra note 92, art. 29(2)(a). Article 29(b) states that,
where the parties have not agreed on number and method of appointment, the Com-
mission will be composed of three members, each party 'selecting one member, and
the third selected by party agreement. Id. art 29(b). Article 30 is the faliback provi-
1990-1991]
606 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 14:578
ance with the provisions of the ICSID Convention and Concili-
ation Rules; any question of procedure that is not covered by
either shall be decided by the commission.' The duties of
the commission and disputants are specified l0 3 and the com-
mon proviso-the prohibition on the invocation of or reliance
on any opinions or statements expressed or published during
the conciliation at any other proceeding, unless the parties
agree otherwise-is included.0 4  The ICSID Conciliation
Rules provide more detailed rules of procedure on the estab-
lishment of the commission, the conciliation process, and ter-
mination of the proceedings.
There have been only two conciliations initiated at the
Centre to date. The first conciliation case was settled prior to
the institution of the commission.' 0 5 The second, Tesoro Petro-
leum Corporation v. Trinidad and Tobago,' °6 was successfully com-
pleted in 1985. In comparison to the meager use of concilia-
sion. Id. art 30. Although ICSID maintains a Panel of Arbitrators, article 31 allows
conciliators to be appointed from outside the Panel. Id. art 31.
102. Id. art. 33. In addition, article 32 states that the Commission shall be the
judge of its own competence. Id. art. 32(1).
103. Id. art. 34(1). Article 34(1) provides that:
[i]t shall be the duty of the Commission to clarify the issues in dispute be-
tween the parties and endeavour to bring about agreement between them
upon mutually acceptable terms. To that end, the Commission may at any
stage of the proceedings and from time to time recommend terms of settle-
ment to the parties. The parties shall cooperate in good faith with the Com-
mission in order to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, and
shall give their most serious consideration to its recommendations.
Id. art 34(1).
104. Id. art. 35.
105. La SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft fur die Textilindustrie m.b.H v.
Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1).
The case was terminated before the conciliation commission had been constituted.
ICSID, ICSID CASES 1972-1987.
106. ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1; see Nurick & Schnably, The First ICSID Concili-
ation: Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 ICSID REv.-F.I.L.J. 340.
The Tesoro conciliation arose out of an equity joint venture between Tesoro Corp.
and the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Each party took fifty-percent owner-
ship of the shares in the joint venture ("Trinidad-Tesoro"). Relations between the
joint venturers deteriorated, with disputes over taxation and the blocking of dividend
declarations, so that Tesoro decided to sell its shares in Trinidad-Tesoro. In the
agreement, Tesoro was under an obligation to make a first offer to the government;
the ICSID conciliation/arbitration clause was invoked by Tesoro. The parties agreed
on a sole conciliator, Lord Wilberforce, whose proposals formed the basis of a settle-
ment agreement reached between the parties in late 1985, detailing the payment of
dividends to the shareholders. Id.
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tion stands the relatively greater number of arbitrations that
have been conducted under ICSID auspices.' 0 7 Although it is
not possible to determine exactly why there has been scant use
of the ICSID conciliation facility, the reasons posed range from
omission of a conciliation clause in the parties' initial agree-
ment to the perceived disadvantages of conciliation generally,
i.e., its non-binding nature makes it a waste of time and
money. 0 " Further, the nature of the ICSID investment dis-
putes may also contribute to this reluctance.
In conclusion, based on the ICSID experience, it appears
that when conciliation is not the mandatory method for the set-
tlement of disputes covered by an international organization
or treaty mechanism but instead is an optional alternative, con-
tracting parties prefer the adjudicative mechanism of arbitra-
tion.
5. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The international investment world has also been at-
tracted to conciliation as a possibility for bilateral dispute set-
tlement. States have entered into a variety of bilateral treaties
to protect the foreign investments of their nationals. These
agreements have evolved over time, starting with friendship,
commerce and navigation treaties and moving on to invest-
ment insurance agreements. More recently, bilateral invest-
ment treaties ("BITs") have been launched as the contempo-
rary prototype.
The BIT envisages a cross-flow of foreign investment and
creates a broad regime for investment promotion and protec-
tion, imposing reciprocal rights and obligations on the con-
tracting parties. 0 9 Although individual BITs vary, they gener-
ally contain provisions on treatment of the foreign investment,
including the most-favored-nation and national treatment
107. As of the 1988-89 year, nine ICSID arbitrations had produced awards and
eleven had been settled or discontinued. ICSID, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1989). As
of the Summer of 1989, there were nine arbitration cases before the Centre. ICSID,
6 NEWS FROM ICSID 2 (1989).
108. Nurick & Schnably, supra note 106, at 340, 349.
109. See generally U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BIuATERAL IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES (1988) [hereinafter U.N. CENTRE]; ICSID, INVESTMENT LAWS OF
TIE WORLD: INVESTMENT TREATIES (1987 - looseleaf); Pappas, Bibliography - References
on Bilateral Investment Treaties, 4 ICSID REv.-F.I.L.J. 189 (1989).
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principles, currency transfer rights, compensation in the event
of expropriation or other losses, and investment promotion
clauses. ICSID statistics indicate that by the end of 1988, a
total of 309 BITs had been concluded. "o Comprehensive dis-
pute resolution provisions are inserted in these treaties to ad-
dress two forms of disputes that might arise: (i) disputes be-
tween the contracting parties over the application of the treaty,
and (ii) conflict between a contracting party (host state) and an
investor of the other party concerning an investment in the
host state. 'I
Although arbitration is the ultimate resolution method
agreed upon in both cases, conciliation is typically found only
in the procedure for the settlement of disputes between an in-
vestor and the host state. It is likely that conciliation is con-
templated in the latter case, since it is a settlement mechanism
that can help preserve an amicable relationship between the
investor and the host state, thereby facilitating the continua-
tion of the foreign investment. In an investment dispute be-
tween the host state and the investor of the other state, concili-
ation may be inserted as an early, optional phase in the pro-
cess. Interface between the BIT and the multilateral ICSID
Convention can occur here because the ICSID conciliation and
arbitration facilities were specifically created to address these
types of investment disputes and are often accepted for the in-
stitutional procedure." t 2 Disputes between the two states are
sent directly to arbitration if the disputes cannot be settled
through diplomatic channels."'
110. Pappas, supra note 109, at 194.
111. The early BITs did not include the second type of dispute. However, the
establishment of ICSID in 1965 led to the express coverage of the host state-investor
dispute, with the current BIT approach being to cover the situation even if the states
involved are not party to the ICSID Convention. U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, at 96.
However, some states, particularly those in Latin America, still take the position that
host state-investor disputes must be decided under the domestic laws of the host.
112. For an ICSID reference, the contracting parties must also be party to the
ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility must be applicable. See generally
Broches, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in
THE ART OF ARBITRATION (J. Schultsz & A. Van Den Berg eds. 1982).
113. U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, at 89-91; see Federal Republic of Germany -
St. Lucia Agreement, id. annex II, art. 10; Netherlands Revised Model Agreement, id.
annex IV, art. 13; United States Prototype Treaty, id. annex V, art. VII; Asian-African
Legal Consultative Committee Revised Model Agreement, id. annex VI, models A &
B, art. 11.
CONCILIATION
Some model BITs that have been adopted by various
countries contain clauses including conciliation as a method
for the settlement of investment disputes between the host
state and the investor. The Netherlands Revised Model Agree-
ment," 4 the United States Prototype Treaty, 1 5 and the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee Revised Draft of Model
Agreements for Promotion and Protection of Investments (the
"AALCC Model Agreements")" 16 all contain such a provision.
For example, the AALCC Model Agreements do not to-
tally rely on the ICSID mechanism. Pursuant to article 10 of
each model agreement, three stages of dispute settlement are
created: negotiations, conciliation and arbitration. Consent of
the parties to conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the
BIT is given in article 10(i). If negotiations break down, article
10(ii) states that either party can initiate conciliation or arbitra-
tion proceedings if the local remedies requirements have been
satisfied. If conciliation proceedings are implemented, unless
the parties have agreed to use the ICSID Convention facilities,
it is specified that conciliation shall take place under the UNCI-
TRAL Conciliation Rules." 17 If conciliation fails, article 10(iv)
and (v) requires that the dispute be referred to arbitration on
the behest of either party.
In contrast, article VI of the U.S. Prototype Treaty is rela-
tively sophisticated and focuses on the ICSID facilities. The
first phase, in article VI(2), involves consultation and negotia-
tion, which may include the use of non-binding third party pro-
cedures. Presumably, this could cover the use of good offices,
mediation, and conciliation as well as the ICSID Additional Fa-
cility. "8 Article VI(3)(a) provides that the investor may choose
114. U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, annex IV, art. 9.
115. Id. annex V, arts. VI(2) & (3) (1984 Model); see Vandevelde, The Bilateral
Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 200, 256-75 (1988);
see, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, July 22,
1985, arts. VI(2) & (3), reprinted in 1 ICSID REv.-F.I.L.J. 219; Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Turkey concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, arts. VI(2) & (3), reprinted
in id. at 415.
116. Models A & B, art. 10, U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, at annex VI.
117. Id. art. 10(iii); see UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18; infra notes
147-150 and accompanying text.
118. An earlier 1983 draft specifically refers to the ICSID Additional Facility,
while the 1984 draft does not. Vandevelde, supra note 115, at 262 n.403.
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to consent to the submission of the dispute to ICSID, or the
ICSID Additional Facility, for settlement by conciliation or ar-
bitration, provided that certain criteria are satisfied." 9 Article
VI(3)(b) contains the consent of both state parties to the sub-
mission of an investment dispute to ICSID conciliation or arbi-
tration. Once the investor has consented to the use of ICSID,
either the host state or the investor can institute proceedings,
and if the parties disagree over whether conciliation or arbitra-
tion is the more appropriate procedure to be utilized, the opin-
ion of the investor shall prevail.' 20 Although the U.S. Proto-
type Treaty does not expressly state that ICSID conciliation, if
unsuccessful, can be followed by arbitration, it is always open
to the parties to agree on such a sequence.
In contrast, some BITs do not expressly include concilia-
tion in the event of an investment dispute, directing the host
state and the investor to arbitration if they cannot settle their
dispute amicably.' 2 ' In particular instances, this may be due to
the fact that neither contracting party had signed the ICSID
Convention when the BIT was negotiated. For example,
neither the first BIT entered into by Canada with the Soviet
Union nor other recent BITs involving the Soviet Union in-
clude conciliation. 2 2 However, this does not preclude the use
119. U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, U.S. Prototype Treaty, annex V, art. VI(3)(a).
Article VI(3)(a) provides that the investor cannot submit the dispute to ICSID until
six months after the date on which the dispute arose have elapsed, the investor must
.not have submitted the dispute for resolution in accordance with any applicable pre-
viously agreed dispute settlement procedures, and the investor has not brought the
dispute before the courts or the administrative tribunals of the host state. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., U.N. CENTRE, supra note 109, annex II, art. 10; ICSID, supra note
109, Federal Republic of Germany-St. Lucia Treaty Concerning The Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, March 16, 1985, art. 10 (investment dis-
putes shall be submitted for arbitration under the ICSID Convention).
122. At time of writing neither Canada nor the U.S.S.R. are ICSID contracting
parties. Canada - U.S.S.R. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Nov. 20, 1989, Treaty Section, Department of External Affairs, Can-
ada, art. IX (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office); France -
U.S.S.R. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
July 4, 1989, art. 7, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 317 (1990); Federal Republic of Germany -
U.S.S.R. Treaty on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, June 13,
1989, art. 10 reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 351; U.S.S.R. - U.K. Agreement for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Apr. 6, 1989, art. 8, reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
366 (1989).
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of conciliation, because the disputants are always free to agree
on its use during their settlement negotiations.
In conclusion, it is apparent that a number of states in-
volved in the negotiation of BITs anticipate that maintenance
of the investment relationship between the host state and the
investor warrants a layered dispute resolution structure that in-
cludes non-binding methods such as conciliation. Due to the
recency of BIT negotiation, however, it is too early to deter-
mine whether the conciliation alternative will be implemented
to any material degree if and when investment disputes erupt.
B. Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Settlement of International
Business Disputes
In the resolution of disputes arising out of an interna-
tional business relationship, parties have tended to avoid judi-
cial settlement. Insteadw,,international commercial arbitration
is the route preferred by many. There are a variety of advan-
tages to the use of arbitration, including the ability of the par-
ties to structure the arbitration, the binding nature of the
award, and its enforceability in many jurisdictions.123 Concilia-
tion is another alternative that has generated greater interest
in the West in recent years-and has been a common form of
domestic dispute resolution in the East for centuries. 2 4 The
several sets of flexible institutional rules that have been estab-
lished to facilitate conciliation proceedings are illustrative of
the movement. In addition, recent national legislation recog-
nizes the viability of conciliation as a solution to international
business disputes, and many regional arbitration centres also
offer conciliation support.
123. See generally A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION (1986); U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [herein-
after U.N. Convention on Recognition and Awards].
124. See, e.g., Dress, supra note 15; Jarvin, supra note 32; Herrmann, supra note
19; Jakubowski, Reflections on the Philosophy of International Commercial Arbitration and Con-
ciliation, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 175 J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982);
Hoellering, Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CH. 785 (1986); Perlman & Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International
Commercial Disputes, 17 INT'L LAw. 215 (1983).
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1. The International Chamber of Commerce Conciliation
Rules
One of the major activities of the International Chamber
of Commerce (the "ICC") is assistance in the settlement of in-
ternational business disputes. Arbitration under the auspices
of the ICC is accepted worldwide. In addition, ICC concilia-
tion is also made available to facilitate the amicable settlement
of disputes, although it is extremely underused compared to
the numbers of ICC arbitrations. The most recent amend-
ments to the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration en-
tered into force on January 1, 1988."5 In particular, the ICC
Conciliation Rules were extensively revised both to promote
the initiation of conciliation and to refine the process.
Reference to the ICC Conciliation Rules in the event of a
contractual dispute between parties should be established by
the inclusion of a clause to that effect in the contract. The ICC
proceeds on the basis that resort to conciliation is optional un-
less the parties have otherwise agreed. 2 6 There is some in-
flexibility involved because the ICC Conciliation Rules, unlike
the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 2 7 do not contain a gen-
eral provision that permits the disputants to agree to vary or
delete any of the ICC Conciliation Rules when the process is
implemented.
The two most striking amendments to the ICC Concilia-
tion Rules are the rationalization of the procedure to initiate
conciliation, and the number of conciliators used. The previ-
ous rules provided for a conciliation committee of three mem-
bers appointed in a cumbersome manner involving the Admin-
istrative Commission for Conciliation, whereas in the new ICC
Conciliation Rules, article 1 specifies that if conciliation is
used, it is to be conducted by a sole conciliator appointed by
125. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18.
126. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18. The ICC recommends the following
clause:
All disputes arising in connection with the present contract shall be finally
settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance
with the said Rules.
Id. at 234.
127. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 1(2) (providing that
"parties may agree to exclude or vary any of these Rules at any time").
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the ICC.'2 s The consent and appointment process has also
been simplified. Pursuant to article 2, the party requesting
conciliation must apply to the Secretariat of the Court of the
ICC, who informs the other disputant of the request. That
party has fifteen days to inform the Secretariat whether or not
it agrees to participate in the conciliation process; a negative
reply or silence is deemed to be a rejection of the conciliation
request, whereas an affirmative response establishes the agree-
ment to conciliate and authorizes the Secretary-General of the
Court to appoint a conciliator as soon as possible.129
The current ICC Conciliation Rules have expanded upon
some aspects of the conciliation procedure and simplified
others; the changes should facilitate the smooth operation of
an ICC conciliation. The conciliator is given the broad power
in article 5 to "conduct the conciliation process as he thinks fit,
guided by the principles of impartiality, equity and justice."'3 °
With the agreement of the parties, the conciliator fixes the
place for conciliation, may request the submission of addi-
tional information at any time, and the parties may be assisted
by counsel of their own choice.13' Other than this, the ICC
Conciliation Rules do not establish procedural requirements
that the conciliator must follow. Clearly, the essence of concil-
iation and the article 5 obligation will be circumvented if the
conciliator does not at least permit the parties to present their
positions, and if the conciliator does not present her recom-
mendations to the disputants. Respect for the confidential na-
ture of the conciliation process is imposed on all persons in-
volved in the process.13 2 If the parties sign a settlement agree-
ment upon completion of a conciliation, the ICC Conciliation
Rules stipulate that the agreement is binding on the parties,
and that it must remain confidential unless and to the extent
that its application or execution requires disclosure.13 3
Two crucial conciliation provisions are maintained and ex-
panded upon in the ICC Conciliation Rules. First, article 10
128. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 1; W. CRAIG, W. PARK, &J. PAUL-
SSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 682 (2d ed. 1990).
129. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, arts. 3-4.
130. Id. art 5.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 6.
133. Id. art. 7(a).
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states that, unless the parties agree otherwise, the conciliator
shall not act in any judicial or arbitral proceedings relating to
the dispute which has been the subject of the conciliation,
whether as an arbitrator, representative, or counsel of a party.
Additionally, the conciliator shall not be called as a witness in
any further proceedings. 3 4 The rationale underlying this pro-
hibition is that the conciliator obtains a comprehensive knowl-
edge of the disputants' cases, including their strengths and
weaknesses, so that the willingness of the parties to confide in
the conciliator might be compromised if they feared that their
disclosures might be used by the conciliator against their inter-
ests in a subsequent proceeding.'"3
Second, article 11 provides that the parties agree not to
introduce in any judicial or arbitral proceeding, as evidence or
in any matter whatsoever,
(a) any views expressed or suggestions made by any party
with regard to the possible settlement of the dispute;
(b) any proposals put forward by the conciliator;
(c) the fact that a party had indicated that it was ready to
accept some proposal for a settlement put forward by the
conciliator.' 36
This clause is considerably more elaborate than the for-
mer rules. 137 The provision is included in conciliation rules
with the same objective: to provide an atmosphere of security
to encourage the disputants to conciliate and make full disclo-
sure of their positions without fear of prejudicing any further
arbitral or judicial proceedings. 138
Statistics on the use of the ICC arbitration and concilia-
tion facilities illustrate that conciliation is infrequently used by
disputants, especially when compared to the use of ICC arbi-
tration. In the initial years, from 1923-1929, conciliation was
quite popular, especially when compared to the number of ar-
bitrations. In May 1929, of the 337 requests registered by the
ICC Court, 120 had been brought to conclusion as follows:
eighty by amicable settlement, twenty-one by conciliation, and
134. Id. art. 10.
135. Herrmann, supra note 19, at 161.
136. ICC Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 11.
137. Id.
138. Herrmann, supra note 19, at 162.
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nineteen by arbitral award.'5 9 At that time, there were more
successful conciliations than arbitrations. Such activity in the
international commercial arena paralleled the attraction to
conciliation in the inter-state system. 140 However, the data for
1983-1987 shows a marked decline in resort to conciliation,
and the reverse relationship between arbitration and concilia-
tion. During this later period, there were forty-two requests
for conciliation, nine of which were withdrawn, nine turned
into arbitrations, ten were still pending, and fourteen were
successfully conciliated. 14 ' In contrast, the same five-year pe-
riod saw 1,545 requests for arbitration, although 832 were
withdrawn before proceedings started or before final award
and ninety-seven resulted in awards by consent. I.42 The low
level of ICC conciliation activation, in both absolute and rela-
tive numbers, is illustrative of the modern transnational system
in which arbitration is the dominant extra-judicial settlement
mechanism. It is unlikely that the major revisions to the ICC
Conciliation Rules will result in a marked acceleration in the
use of ICC conciliation in the absence of an alteration in the
attitudes of the parties to an international business relation-
ship. A greater receptivity to the concept of conciliation as a
viable alternative for dispute resolution is required.
2. The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules
The main objective of the UNCITRAL is to further the
progressive harmonization and unification of the law of inter-
national trade by, inter alia, drafting treaties, model laws, and
uniform laws. 143 Although the initial focus of UNCITRAL in
the dispute resolution field was on arbitration, it soon turned
its attention to conciliation, producing the UNCITRAL Concil-
iation Rules, which were adopted by the.U.N. General Assem-
139. Gaudet, Overcoming Regional Diferences, in ARBITRATION IN SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DIsPUTEs INVOLVING THE FAR EAST AND ARBITRATION IN
COMBINED TRANSPORTATION 301, 303 (P. Sanders ed. 1989).
140. SeeJ. MERRILLS, supra note 5.
141. Gaudet, supra note 139, at 303.
142. Id. at 304. In 1989, only five requests for conciliation were received
whereas 304 requests for arbitration were made. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON,
supra note 128, at 681.
143. G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes 3, U.N. Doc. A/6369 and Add. 1
& 2 (1966).
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.bly in 1980.144 Although one view in UNCITRAL was that
conciliation was of doubtful value, the stronger viewpoint sup-
ported the drafting of UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. This
viewpoint was due both to the perceived trend in many coun-
tries to settle disputes by conciliation, and the viability of con-
ciliation as an alternative to arbitration. 45
The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules technically have a
broader application than the ICSID (legal disputes arising out
of an investment between the investor and host state) or ICC
Conciliation Rules (business disputes of an international char-
acter). The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules are not necessarily
limited to business disputes or to an international relationship,
although the U.N. General Assembly resolution adopting the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules recommended that they be
used to settle disputes arising out of international commercial
relations. 46 Again, due to the relative youth of the UNCI-
TRAL Conciliation Rules, it is not yet possible to gauge the
degree to which they have or will be utilized in the drafting of
contractual dispute resolution clauses.
The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules are more detailed
than the closest alternative, the ICC Conciliation Rules. Yet
the concept underlying the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules is
that there must be simplicity and flexibility of application to
permit the parties to modify the rules and terminate the pro-
ceedings at any point. 47 In this vein, article 1(2) of the UNCI-
TRAL Conciliation Rules permits the parties to agree to vary
or exclude any of the rules at any time. As noted, this freedom
is not granted when the ICC Conciliation rules are used. Con-
ciliation proceedings can be initiated if there is acceptance by
one party of an invitation to conciliate made by the other pur-
suant to article 2. The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules provide
144. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See generally I. DORE, supra note
17, at 8-9; Herrmann, supra note 19; Herrmann, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Concili-
ation Rules, VI Y.B. COMM'L ARB. 170 (1981).
145. Report of UNCITRAL on the Work of its Twelfth Session, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/34/17 (1979) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Report].
146. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18. Pursuant to article 1(1), the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules apply to the "conciliation of disputes arising out of
or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship where the parties seeking an
amicable settlement of their dispute have agreed that the UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules apply". d. art 1 (1).
147. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 145, at 86.
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for one conciliator, unless the parties agree that there shall be
two or three. In the latter situation, the conciliators "ought, as
a general rule, to act jointly."'' 4
The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules covering the concilia-
tion procedure are considerably more specific than the ICC
Conciliation Rules. They provide for initial submission of
party statements on the dispute and the points at issue to the
conciliator and to each other, the right of the disputants to be
represented or assisted by persons of their choice, and a series
of directions to the conciliator on her role. 149 Pursuant to arti-
cle 7(1), the conciliator is instructed to assist the parties in
their attempt to obtain amicable dispute settlement, and must
act independently and impartially in fulfilling this duty. Article
7(2) further requires that
[t]he conciliator will be guided by principles of fairness, eq-
uity and justice, giving consideration to, among other
things, the rights and obligations of the parties, the usages
of the trade concerned and the circumstances surrounding
the dispute, including any previous business practices of the
parties.1 5 0
Beyond this, the conciliator has the freedom to conduct the
proceedings in such a manner as thought appropriate,
although the circumstances of the case and the express wishes
of the parties must be taken into account.' 5' In contrast to the
ICC Conciliation Rules, which provide the conciliating entity
with a general but vague power, the UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules specify that the conciliator may, at any stage of the pro-
ceedings, make informal proposals for dispute resolution and
may meet or communicate with the parties, either separately or
together. 152
Furthermore, in contrast to the ICC Conciliation Rules
148. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 18, art. 3.. Article 4 of the UN-
CITRAL Conciliation Rules provides a detailed process for the appointment of the
conciliator(s), moving from party agreement to third person or institutional assist-
ance. Id. art. 4.
149. Id. arts 5-7.
150. Id. art. 7(2).
151. Id. art. 7(3).
152. Id. arts. 7(4) & 9(1). Article 10 provides that if the conciliator receives fac-
tual information on the dispute from a party, she is to disclose the substance of that
information to the other party unless the first disputant provides the material on the
condition of confidentiality. Id. art 10.
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which are silent on the matter, the UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules address actions of the disputants. The parties are di-
rected to cooperate with the conciliator in good faith, and each
can play an affirmative role in the resolution process by sub-
mitting to the conciliator, on their own initiative or at her invi-
tation, suggestions for the settlement of the dispute.15 3 In arti-
cle 16, the parties are expressly enjoined from initiating any
arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of the dispute during
the conciliation process unless such proceedings are, in the
opinion of the party taking the action, necessary to preserve its
rights.
Pursuant to article 13, after the conciliator has found it
possible to submit terms of a possible settlement to the dispu-
tants, the parties participate in the process by providing their
observations, which are to be taken into account by the concili-
ator in any reformulation. If the parties reach agreement on
dispute resolution, they are directed to draw up and sign a
binding settlement agreement, unless they request the concili-
ator to do so or to assist them. The usual confidentiality re-
quirement is imposed on the parties and the conciliator
through article 14, which covers both the proceedings and any
settlement agreement, except that the agreement can be dis-
closed for enforcement purposes.
Identical to the ICC Conciliation Rules,' the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules include the two important provisions on the
role of the conciliator and the admissibility of evidence in
other proceedings. First, article 19 of the UNCITRAL Concili-
ation Rules stipulates that all parties undertake that the concili-
ator will not act as an arbitrator, representative, or counsel of a
party, or be called as a witness, in any arbitral or judicial pro-
ceedings on the same dispute. As with article 10 of the ICC
Conciliation Rules, this provision can be altered by party
agreement; in the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, however,
this possibility is permitted indirectly by operation of article
1(2). Second, in article 20 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules, the parties undertake not to rely on or introduce as evi-
dence in arbitral or judicial proceedings all views, suggestions,
or admissions of the parties, proposals made by the concilia-
tor, or the other party's willingness to accept a settlement pro-
153. Id. arts. 11-12.
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posal made by the conciliator. On this topic, however, the ICC
Conciliation Rules in article 11 do not allow the parties to vary
the rule by agreement. In contrast, the UNCITRAL Concilia-
tion Rules permit all the rules to be varied by the disputants,
including the prohibition on introduction of evidence.
In conclusion, both the ICC and UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules cover all types of international business disputes. How-
ever, beyond the aims common to both sets of rules-the ami-
cable conciliation of disputes and the grant of considerable
freedom of action to the disputants and the conciliator-they
do take different approaches. The ICC Conciliation Rules are
less detailed but, accordingly, do not overtly restrict the activi-
ties of the conciliator beyond the minimum required to ensure
fair process. The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, on the other
hand, contain more elaborate details on the procedure, but
permit the parties to modify or exclude any or all of the rules
by agreement. In a choice between the two, the deciding fac-
tors may be reduced to familiarity and convenience: the ICC
Conciliation Rules are supported by a reputable institution,
whereas an UNCITRAL conciliation must be conducted by the
disputants and the conciliator without assistance, unless an in-
stitution providing conciliation services has adopted the UN-
CITRAL Conciliation Rules. In common, however, both the
ICC and UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules are subject to underu-
tilization relative to international commercial arbitration rules.
3. Conciliation Rules Adopted by Other Institutions
A wide variety of domestic arbitration associations/centres
and chambers of commerce have adopted conciliation rules for
use by parties desirous of resorting to the procedure. The es-
tablishments that offer the conciliation option are located
throughout the world.'54 Recently, for example, the British
Columbia International Arbitration Centre was established,
and rules were created for international commercial arbitration
and conciliation proceedings to be held in the centre. 155 How-
ever, these centres generate most of their business from the
154. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (E. Cohn, M. Domke & F. Eisemann eds. 1977).
155. Reprinted in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA 201 (Paterson &
Thompson eds. 1987).
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conduct of arbitrations, and comparatively few conciliations
are conducted. Taking a different approach, not involving the
creation of additional conciliation rules, regional centres for
arbitration established in Kuala Lumpur and Cairo include
among their functions the facilitation of conciliation under the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules.' 56
4. Domestic Arbitration Laws Supportive of Conciliation
Apart from those Eastern Pacific Rim states which have
historically favoured conciliation, legislative endorsement of
conciliation is appearing in the West in the form of laws gov-
erning the conduct of international commercial arbitration that
include supportive provisions for conciliation as a preliminary
or additional resolution method. In particular, the statutory
activity is occurring in those Western jurisdictions with a Pa-
cific Rim orientation.
Although the drafters of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (the "UNCITRAL
Model Law") did discuss the inclusion of references to concili-
ation as another mechanism for settling disputes, the final
draft of the Model Law did not contain any provisions on con-
ciliation. 157 Nonetheless, most of the Canadian provinces and
territories-the first jurisdictions to create domestic interna-
tional commercial arbitration laws based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law-have unilaterally inserted references to concilia-
tion and mediation in their legislation.15 8 The statutes do not
156. These centres were established under the auspices of the Asian-African
Legal Consultative Committee. Lin, The Kuala Lumpur Regional Arbitration Centre, 3
ICSID REV.- F.I.L.J. 118, 120 (1988).
157. See generally H. HOLTZMANN & J. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
COMMENTARY 1118, 1142-45 (1989).
158. The International Commercial Arbitration Act of Alberta, ALTA. REV. STAT.
(1986), ch. 1-6.6, § 5; The International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Co-
lumbia, B.C. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 14, § 30(1); The International Commercial Arbi-
tration Act of Manitoba, MAN. REV. STAT. (1986-87), ch. 32, § 5; The International
Commercial Arbitration Act of New Brunswick, N.B. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 1-12.2,
§ 5; The International Commercial Arbitration Act of Newfoundland, NFLD. REV.
STAT. (1986), ch. 45, § 6; The International Commercial Arbitration Act of Nova Sco-
tia: N.S. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 12, § 6; The International Commercial Arbitration Act
of Ontario, ONT. REV. STAT. (1988), ch. 30, § 3; The Commercial Arbitration Act of
Prince Edward Island, P.E.I. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 14, § 5; The International Com-
mercial Arbitration Act of Saskatchewan, SASK. STAT. (1988-89), ch. 1-10.2, § 4; The
International Commercial Arbitration Act of Yukon, YUK. ORD. (1987), ch. 14, § 3.
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structure conciliation as a mechanism to be used prior to arbi-
tration, envisaging it, instead, as a superadditional method
since they permit the arbitral tribunal, if the disputants agree,
to utilize conciliation or other procedures during the arbitration.
For example, the British Columbia International Commercial
Arbitration Act, section 30(1) states that
[i]t is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for an
arbitral tribunal to encourage settlement of the dispute and,
with the agreement of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may
use mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time
during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement.' 59
Drafted in a slightly different fashion, the other Canadian
provincial laws referring to conciliation, as illustrated by sec-
tion 5 of the Alberta International Commercial Arbitration
Act, state that
[flor the purpose of encouraging settlement of a dispute, an
arbitral tribunal may, with the agreement of the parties, em-
ploy mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time
during the arbitration proceedings and, with the agreement
of the parties, the members of the arbitral tribunal are not
disqualified from resuming their roles as arbitrators by rea-
son of the mediation, conciliation or other procedure.' 6 °
The reasons supporting the inclusion of the British Co-
lumbia provision have been stated as being the promotion of
an amicable settlement by any method acceptable to the dispu-
tants, and the recognition that some people have traditionally
preferred conciliation or mediation over arbitration.' 6' It is
implicit in the British Columbia provision that the arbitrator
can resume his duties if the conciliation attempt fails; consent
of the parties to this event is not specifically required. In con-
trast, the Alberta legislation (and that of the other relevant Ca-
The North West Territories, Quebec, and Canadian federal statutes do not refer mat-
ters to conciliation or mediation.
159. International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia, B.C. REV.
STAT. (1986), ch. 14, § 30(1).
160. International Commercial Arbitration Act of Alberta, ALTA. REV. STAT.
(1986), ch. 1-6.6, § 5.
161. See Paterson, International Commercial Arbitration Act: An Overview, in UNCI-
TRAL ARBrrRATION MODEL IN CANADA, supra note 155, at 113, 122. See infra text
accompanying notes 176 - 203 for discussion of conciliation preference in Pacific Rim
states.
1990-1991]
622 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:578
nadian provinces) makes the express agreement of the parties
a prerequisite to recommencement of the arbitration.
Hong Kong, influenced by both Eastern and Western con-
cepts of dispute settlement, has also expressly recognized con-
ciliation. The Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (the "Ordi-
nance" or the "Hong Kong Ordinance") addresses concilia-
tion as a procedure used prior to arbitration. In addition, the
Ordinance has been amended recently to allow an arbitrator to
act as a conciliator during the arbitration itself.162 With re-
spect to conciliation as a preliminary mechanism, the Ordi-
nance states that no objection can be made to the appointment
of the conciliator as the arbitrator in the same dispute, pursu-
ant to the parties' agreement, in the event that the conciliation
effort fails. 1 63
The new provision, on the power of the arbitrator to act as
a conciliator, permits such dual activity if all parties consent in
writing and for so long as no party withdraws his consent in
writing.' 64 The Ordinance also ensures that no objection shall
be taken to the conduct of arbitration proceedings by an arbi-
trator solely on the ground that he had acted previously as a
conciliator pursuant to the new section.' 65 Thus, the legisla-
tion affirmatively ensures that the arbitration can resume. The
amendments impose some statutory control over the conduct
of the arbitrator/conciliator. The issues of communication
with the parties and treatment of confidential information are
162. Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. 341, L.H.K. 1982, as amended by
Arbitration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, 1989, §§ 2A-2B [hereinafter Hong
Kong Arbitration Ordinance] (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal
office); see The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on the Adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Topic 17 (the Report
forms a schedule to the Arbitration Ordinance and may be referred to by the courts
in interpreting the legislation) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal
office); McInnis, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 391
(1989); Hunter, Arbitration in Hong Kong, in ARBITRATION IN SETrLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING THE FAR EAST AND ARBITRATION IN COM-
BINED TRANSPORTATION, supra note 139, at 73; Tisdall, The Hong Kong International
Commercial Arbitration Centre, in PATERSON AND THOMPSON, supra note 155, at 31;
Thomas, Arbitration in Hong Kong, 14 I.B.L. 142 (1986).
163. Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 162, § 2A(2). The Hong
Kong Law Reform Commission noted that prior to the introduction of this provision
it was regarded as improper for a conciliator to become an arbitrator and an arbitra-
tion could be set aside on this basis. Id.
164. Id. § 2B(l).
165. Id. § 2B(4).
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regulated. An arbitrator acting as a conciliator may communi-
cate with the parties collectively or separately, and shall treat
information obtained from a party as confidential unless that
party otherwise agrees or the conciliation process terminates
without resulting in a settlement agreement.' 66 In the latter
event, before the arbitration resumes, confidential information
obtained by an arbitrator/conciliator during the conciliation
must be disclosed to all other parties to the extent he considers
material to the arbitration proceedings. 16 7
Strong commercial connections with the People's Repub-
lic of China, a country favouring conciliation, clearly influ-
enced the establishment of the conciliation provisions in the
Hong Kong Ordinance. The Hong Kong Law Reform Com-
mission (the "Hong Kong Commission") recommended that
the Ordinance be amended to permit the use of conciliation
during the arbitral process, applicable to both domestic and
international arbitrations. 168 The Hong Kong Commission un-
derlined that the purpose for requiring that the arbitrator/con-
ciliator disclose confidential, material information obtained
during the failed conciliation, prior to resumption of the arbi-
tration, is "to provide a statutory framework within which an
arbitrator can conciliate without committing misconduct by
breaching the rules of natural justice."' 69 Although the Hong
Kong Commission recognized that the disclosure requirement
might repress the frankness of the disputants, it was of the
opinion that this was a better alternative than compelling the
arbitrator to attempt to ignore material information. In addi-
tion, it could see no procedural difficulty in such an ap-
proach. i70
As discussed below, the superadded conciliation proce-
dure is in common use in the People's Republic of China.
However, the procedure used in the Canadian and Hong Kong
legislation raises the issue of the propriety of the arbitrator
166. Id. §§ 2B(2)(a)-(b).
167. Id. § 2B(3).
168. Id. § 4.35.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Commission suggested that if the arbitrator were to send to each
disputant a list of information she regarded as material and disclosable and the arbi-
trator considered the views of each party before acting, then the chances of error
would be small.
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playing a dual role. The approach of a conciliator is different
from that of an arbitrator. A conciliator acts affirmatively in a
manner designed to bring the parties to an amicable resolu-
tion, often posing compromissory recommendations, whereas
the approach of an arbitrator is usually more detached and le-
galistic. The potential problems of the conciliator/arbitrator
not maintaining confidentiality of or misusing information
have to be addressed. Article 10 of the ICC Conciliation Rules
and article 19 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules recognize
the problems associated with the conciliator becoming the ar-
bitrator in subsequent proceedings, let alone mixing the two
roles in the same process. Evidently, the Canadian and Hong
Kong legislators have decided that party autonomy should
govern: if the disputants consent to the conduct of conciliation
during an arbitration it should be permitted and vice versa.
The Hong Kong Ordinance, however, addresses the concerns
raised and, accordingly, is the more sophisticated legal regime,
since it imposes some control over the conduct of the arbitra-
tor/conciliator during and after the conciliation process. Yet,
any remaining concerns about an arbitrator playing a dual role
should not prejudice the consideration of a conciliation being
held prior to any arbitration.
California has also recognized the potential of conciliation
as an international business dispute resolution mechanism. As
the first U.S. state to pass legislation based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, it has in-
cluded conciliation as an optional, preliminary method for the
settlement of disputes. The California International Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Act (the "California Act") 1 7 ' separates
the conciliation initiative from any subsequent arbitral pro-
ceedings. Also, the California Act incorporates a variety of
provisions governing the conduct of the conciliation. This ap-
proach can be contrasted with the Hong Kong Ordinance
where it addresses conciliation as a preliminary method and
which contains only a few provisions with respect to the pro-
ceedings.
171. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.432 [hereinafter Act]. See Wright, Cali-
fornia's International Commercial Arbitration Act New Procedures For the Arbitration and Con-
ciliation of International Commercial Disputes, 17 I.B.L. 45 (1989); Golbert & Kolkey, Cali-
fornia's Adoption of a Code For International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation, 10 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 583 (1988).
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The California Act applies to international commercial
conciliation held within the state based on the definitions ap-
plied by the UNCITRAL Model Law. 17 2 The California Act ex-
pressly states that it is the policy of the State of California to
encourage parties to an international commercial agreement
or transaction to which the California Act applies to resolve
any dispute arising out of the relationship by conciliation.' 7 3
The legislation sets out the familiar provisions concerning the
conduct of the conciliation and the duties of the parties in-
volved, permitting the parties' agreement to include the use of
particular conciliation rules. 1 74 As with the ICC and UNCI-
TRAL Conciliation Rules, the California Act contains those el-
ements that protect the integrity of the conciliation process. 75
The California Act goes several steps further and provides that
the parties' agreement to conciliate shall be deemed to be their
agreement to stay all arbitral/judicial proceedings, and that all
applicable limitation periods shall be tolled or extended. 176
All of the legislation discussed enables a settlement agree-
ment reached pursuant to conciliation to be recorded in the
same form and with the same effect as an arbitral award,
thereby adding state support to the enforceability of such an
agreement. The Canadian provincial legislation enables a set-
tlement, reached by a conciliation conducted during arbitra-
tion, to be recorded in the form and with the same effect as an
172. Act, supra note 171, §§ 1297.12, 1297.13 (defining international concilia-
tion agreement), 1297.14 & 1297.16 (defining "commercial").
173. Id. § 1297.341.
174. See, e.g., id. §§ 1297.342 (conciliator(s) shall be guided by principles of ob-
jectivity, fairness and justice), 1297.343 (conciliator(s) may conduct proceedings in
manner considered appropriate taking into account wishes of parties and circum-
stances of the case), 1297.23 (where Act refers to the agreement of parties, it shall
include any conciliation rules referred to in that agreement), & 1297.391 (termina-
tion of conciliation).
175. In particular, evidence of anything stated or admitted during the concilia-
tion is not admissible in evidence and disclosure thereof cannot be compelled in a
civil action, although evidence can be admitted if all parties consent to the disclosure.
Id. § 1297.371. The conciliatgr is prohibited from serving as an arbitrator or taking
part in any arbitral or judicial proceedings in the same dispute unless all parties con-
sent or the conciliation/arbitration rules adopted by the parties provide otherwise.
Id. § 1297.393.
176. Id. § 1297.381 (stay agreement operates from commencement of concilia-
tion proceedings) 1297.382 (limitation periods tolled upon formation of parties'
agreement to participate in conciliation until tenth day following termination of pro-
cess).
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arbitral award on agreed terms, but only if requested by the
parties and the arbitrator does not object.' 7 The Hong Kong
legislation applies to written settlement agreements reached by
parties to an arbitration, thereby covering successful concilia-
tion settlement agreements reached either before or during ar-
bitration. 7 The Hong Kong Ordinance does not make en-
forceability contingent on the parties' consent. The Hong.
Kong Ordinance provides that where the parties to an arbitra-
tion agreement have been successful in entering into a settle-
ment agreement, that agreement shall be treated as an award
on an arbitration agreement and may, by leave of the court or a
judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment
or order to the same effect and, where leave is given, judgment
may be entered in terms of the agreement. 179 The California
Act covers only conciliations conducted separate from and
prior to an arbitration. Nonetheless, the California Act treats a
written settlement agreement reached pursuant to conciliation
as an arbitral award, gives it the same force and effect as a final
award, and does not require the consent of the parties to this
event.180
The legislative movement in Hong Kong, California, and
the Canadian provinces, jurisdictions willing to enforce a con-
ciliation settlement agreement obtained either before or dur-
ing arbitration, illustrates a growing Pacific Rim interest in
providing state support for the enforcement of settlement
agreements. The effect of these provisions-in elevating a
contractual conciliation settlement agreement to the same
level as an arbitral award which, pursuant to national laws, may
be enforced in the courts of these states-is to create a
groundbreaking mechanism for the enforcement of successful
conciliations. The issue also arises whether the Convention on
177. See, e.g., International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia,
B.C. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 14, §§ 30(2)-(4). With the other provincial laws, the rele-
vant section on conciliation would interact with article 30 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, which is incorporated into the legislation by schedule. See, e.g., International
Commercial Arbitration Act of Alberta, ALTA. REV. STAT. (1986), ch. 1-6.6, § 5 &
schedule 2 (if requested by the parties and not objected to by the arbitral tribunal,
settlement can be recorded in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms which
has same status and effect as any other award on merits of case).
178. Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 162, § 2C.
179. Id.
180. Act, supra note 171, § 1297.401.
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
"New York Convention") could apply to these settlement
agreements, providing them with an additional international
enforcement mechanism.18 ' It is submitted that the New York
Convention would not apply to conciliation settlement agree-
ments since they are not arbitral awards per se; instead, they are
merely treated like awards and only by the state in which the
conciliation occurred. Independently, however, the possibility
of conciliation settlement enforceability has recently come
under scrutiny.' 8 2 Although some arguments have been made
against affirmative enforcement of conciliation settlement
agreements-such as the claim that enforcement is contrary to
the amicable nature of the process-there is general consensus
on the need to study the issue further. 8 3 However, on this
particular issue, state action appears to be overtaking academic
discussion. In further support of this development, it can be
stated that the parties to a conciliation are not obligated to
reach a settlement agreement on the conciliator's proposals.
They have the freedom to accept or reject the proposals. But if
they do reach agreement, their settlement is a contractual legal
obligation so that any national law or future treaty enforcing
the agreement merely facilitates its preexisting binding charac-
ter.
5. Traditional Usage of Conciliation in Japan and the
People's Republic of China-The Effect on
International Business Transactions
The cultural heritage of the Far East has profoundly af-
fected domestic legal systems in the region. One particular
manifestation is the preferred use of extrajudicial means of dis-
pute settlement, including conciliation. Although a number of
181. U.N. Convention on Recognition and Awards, supra note 123.
182. Glossner, Enforcement of Conciliation Awards, in NEw TRENDS IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE ROLE OF ARBITRAL AND
OTHER INSTITUTIONS 218 (P. Sanders ed. 1983) (attaching suggested draft convention
for enforcement of conciliation awards that follows structure of U.N. Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards); Herrmann, supra note
19, at 163-65 (arguments for and against enforcement, settlement agreements should
be enforceable only if they contain provision by which parties agree to enforcement).
183. Herrmann, supra note 19, at 165.
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countries have been influenced, 8 4 only the legal systems ofJa-
pan and the People's Republic of China will 'be addressed to
examine whether their legal traditions have affected interna-
tional business transactions involving Chinese or Japanese par-
ties.
a. Japan
Nonadjudicative methods of dispute resolution have been
dominant in the Japanese domestic system for centuries. Con-
ciliation has played a major role, although the structure of the
conciliatory process has evolved over the years.' 85 A concep-
tual foundation for the reliance on extrajudicial dispute settle-
ment is the traditional Japanese desire for group harmony,
which itself stems from the influence of Confucian ethics in Ja-
pan.' 86 It has also been argued that a crucial historical factor
that promoted extrajudicial dispute resolution was the discour-
agement of judicial settlement during the premodern feudal
society and the imposition of alternative means, conciliation in
particular. 187
Modern Japanese conciliation is statute-based; it is an op-
tional mechanism for the settlement of civil disputes that can
either be initiated by one of the disputants prior to litigation,
or by the court on receipt of the action.'88 The mechanism is
used as an alternative or a preliminary to litigation. Either a
conciliation committee is struck, composed of a judge and two
184. See, e.g., McDorman, The Teaching of the Law of Thailand, 11 DAL. L. J. 915,
921-22 (1987-1988).
185. D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW TOKUGAWA AND MODERN
(Vol. I-I1 1965); Yamashita, Conciliation, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN XIV 3-1 (Mat-
thew Bender & Co. Inc. 1987). See generally Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society:
Comparisons With the West, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Seki, Effective Dispute Resolution
in United States-Japan Commercial Transactions, 6 NW.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 979 (1984); THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (H. Tanaka ed. 1976); Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Con-
temporary Japan, in LAw IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (A.
von Mehren ed. 1963).
186. See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing Confucian philoso-
phy).
187. See Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAP. STUDIES 359 (1978)
(concluding that Japanese hesitancy to litigate is not so much due to cultural norms
as it is to systemic implementation of attitude through government policy); HENDER-
SON, supra note 185, at 8, 171-81 (describing how conciliation in TokugawaJapan was
imposed on people to excessive degree by Shogunate in attempt to protect hierarchi-
cal society and due to immaturity of legal system).
188. Yamashita, supra note 185, at XIV 3-4 through XIV 3-9.
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or more court-appointed commissioners, or the judge alone
may act as conciliator if thought appropriate.' 8 9 The process is
mediatory in nature as the committee encourages the dispu-
tants to reach a compromise agreement themselves, but the
conciliatory aspect is present since the committee may put for-
ward its own suggestions. 190 However, in the contemporary
Japanese domestic arena where conciliation still retains an im-
portant place in civil affairs generally, it does not appear to be
the favoured method of commercial dispute settlement. In-
stead, the more informal compromise settlement by the parties
through amicable discussions is the preferred route. 9 '
Similarly, conciliation is rarely used as a mechanism for
the settlement of disputes arising out of international business
transactions involving a Japanese entity. 192 Although concilia-
tion services are available at two Japanese institutions that of-
fer commercial arbitration services, the Japan Commercial Ar-
bitration Association and the Japan Shipping Exchange, they
are rarely used.19 3 Instead, international commercial arbitra-
tion is the preferred form of dispute settlement.'94 The differ-
ential use of conciliation in domestic as opposed to interna-
tional commercial matters has been attributed both to the un-
189. Id. The commissioners are appointed by the Supreme Court and must ful-
fill specific criteria for appointment. Id. at XIV 3-8.
190. See Henderson, supra note 185, at 185-86, 220-22 (illustrates conciliatory
aspect); Yamashita, supra note 185, at XIV 3-10 (emphasizes mediatory nature of pro-
cess). If agreement is reached, it is reduced to writing, filed with the court and has
the same effect as a compromise during trial. Id. (Civil Conciliation Law, art. 16).
191. Nomura, Some Aspects of The Use of Commercial Arbitration By Japanese Corpora-
tions, 33 OSAKA U.L. REV. 47, 60-61 (1986). Domestic arbitration is also unpopular,
in contrast to the regular use of arbitration in disputes arising out of international
business transactions. Id. at 47; see Young, Dispute Resolution in Japan: Patterns, Trends,
and Developments, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN 1985 319, 342- 43
(I. Shapiro ed. 1985) (in 1981, only two percent of conciliations in both Summary
Court and District Court involved commercial disputes). Although still different
from the Western view of the legal system, the Japanese attitude towards law and
extrajudicial dispute settlement has changed as the Japanese have become more
"law-conscious" in the post World War II years. THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 185, at 384, 387. See generally Kawashima, supra note 185.
192. Nomura, supra note 191, at 55.
193. Id. at 60-61 (JCAA has commercial conciliation rules and board of concilia-
tors, but only one or two conciliation cases are submitted to the JCAA per year);
Taniguchi, Commercial Arbitration in Japan, in ARBITRATION IN SETrLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING THE FAR EAST AND ARBITRATION IN COM-
BINED TRANSPORTATION, supra note 139, 29 at 38.
194. Taniguchi, supra note 193, at 31; Nomura, supra note 191, at 47.
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familiarity of foreign-parties with conciliation, and the inability
to initiate conciliation unless both disputants agree to its
use.195 However, with respect to the latter rationale, party
consent is also required for international commercial arbitra-
tion, and this aspect has certainly not affected its popularity. It
is likely that Western entities' preference for international
commercial arbitration has influenced Japanese parties in the
use of arbitration. An alternative explanation is that Japanese
parties have not found arbitration unacceptable in the settle-
ment of international business disputes.
b. The People's Republic of China
The legal system of the People's Republic of China (the
"PRC") has been profoundly influenced by two competing
schools of thought-the Confucian philosophy and the legalist
tradition. 196 Confucianism is based on the rule of reason, em-
phasizing hierarchical grouping, social harmony, and the main-
tenance of relationships through virtuous behaviour and com-
promise. Accordingly, extrajudicial means of conflict resolu-
tion, such as conciliation and mediation, are preferred, and
resort to adjudicative methods is considered a rending of the
social fabric. Also, the PRC communist political structure has,
until affected by the developments of the past decade, empha-
sized central control and discouraged the development of an
adjudicative legal system based on the protection of individual
rights. 197 In contrast, the legalist school is based on the rule of
law and has surfaced in the Chinese system periodically. It has
appeared most recently in the last decade, as the PRC has at-
tempted an economic modernization programme which has in-
cluded the enactment of numerous statutes in the commercial
and international business areas.
The dispute settlement system of the PRC still exhibits the
Confucian tradition and consultations, mediation, and concili-
ation continue to play a major role in dispute settlement, with
195. Nomura, supra note 191, at 56.
196. E. LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 1-2 (1985); Lee & Lai,
The Chinese Conception of Law: Confucian, Legalist and Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS LJ. 1307
(1978).
197. Ross, The Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of Zoup-
ing County, Shandong, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 15, 16-7 (1989).
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litigation serving as the last resort.19 8  The terms mediation
and conciliation are often used interchangeably in the PRC
context. In addition, the use of conciliation may not always in-
volve the making of recommendations-the third party may
either simply persuade the parties to reach a solution them-
selves, or may make proposals as a final step in the process.'99
In the PRC, there are three sectors where conciliation is
utilized: the settlement of domestic matters by the populace
through conciliation (or mediation) committees,2 ° ° conciliation
by arbitral bodies, and conciliation by the courts. The latter
two avenues impact upon the settlement of international busi-
ness disputes. Chinese statutes regulating international busi-
ness matters suggest that the disputants use conciliation or
mediation before resort to adjudicative mechanisms, and the
relevant contracts between foreign and PRC parties often sanc-
tion the use of a series of nonadjudicative means of resolution
in the event a dispute arises.20 ' International business dis-
198. E. LEE, supra note 196, at 9. On PRC dispute settlement in both the domes-
tic and international contexts see generally Ross, supra note 197; Farina, "Talking Dis-
putes Into Harmony" China Approaches International Commercial Arbitration, 4 AM. U. J.
INT'L & POL. 137 (1989); Yongzhen, Overview on Resolution of Economic Disputes Involving
Foreign Interests in China: The Legal Basis and the Major Methods, Beijing Review 35 (Octo-
ber 9-15, 1989); Smilde & Tung, Conciliation of Commercial Disputes in the People's Repub-
lic of China, 4 CAN.-AM. L.J. 43 (1988); Jianxin, Mediation, Conciliation, Arbitration and
Litigation in the People's Republic of China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jianxin ed. 1988); Comment, "Far From the Tiger's
Mouth ". Present Practice and Future Prospects For the Settlement of Foreign Commercial Disputes
in the People's Republic of China, 3J.L. & COMM. 115 (1983).
199. Farina, supra note 198, at 151-52; Smilde & Tung, supra note 198, at 54;
Chew-Lafitte, The Resolution of Transnational Commercial Disputes in the People's Republic of
China: A Guide For U.S. Practitioners, 8 YALEJ. W. PUB. ORDER 236, 268 (1982).
200. See Smilde & Tung, supra note 198, at 44-47; E. LEE, supra note 196, at 11-
13.
201. Smilde & Tung, supra note 198, at 51-52; see Law of the People's Republic
of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, July 8, 1979, art. 14 (disputes
between venture parties which cannot be settled through consultations may be set-
tled through mediation or arbitration), reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE's REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA (1979-1982) 150, 153 (1987); Regulations for the Implementation of
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment, Sept. 20, 1983, art. 109 (disputes between venture parties shall,
if possible, be settled through friendly consultation or mediation), reprinted in 2 COL-
LECTIONS OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONCERN-
ING FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 62 (Department of Treaties and Law, Mofert 1985);
Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign
Interest, Mar. 21, 1985, art. 37 (parties shall do everything possible to settle their
dispute through consultation or mediation), reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1983-1986) 162, 167 (1987); Law on Chinese-Foreign Contrac-
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putes fall within the purview of the China Council for the Pro-
motion of International Trade (the "CCPIT") and are dealt
with by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission (the "CIETAC") or the China Maritime Arbi-
tration Commission (the "CMAC"). Both the CIETAC and
the CMAC regularly use mediation and conciliation, including
the making of recommendations, as settlement methods.20 2
Indeed, even if conciliation is unsuccessful and the parties
move on to arbitration, the arbitrators often continue to act in
a conciliatory mode.2 °3 The Chinese courts are also author-
ized to conduct mediation or conciliation prior to, and even
during, judicial resolution.0 4
The preference for nonadjudicative methods has also car-
ried over into the development of the mechanism known as
"joint conciliation," utilized to settle international business
disputes occurring between PRC and foreign entities. 2 5 The
mechanism has been established in arrangements made be-
tween PRC and foreign trade organizations. Arrangements for
the availability ofjoint conciliation were made in 1976 between
representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the
National Council for U.S. China Trade, and the FETAC,
tual Joint Ventures (1988), art. 26 (disputes between venture parties shall be settled
through consultation or mediation; if unwilling to use these methods or their use is
unsuccessful, dispute may be submitted to Chinese or any other arbitration agency
for arbitration), reprinted in LAw IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 771, 776 ( R.
Folsom &J. Minan eds. 1989).
202. Farina, supra note 198, at 152; Grenner, The Evolution of Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration in the People's Republic of China, 21 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 293, 301-07 (1989);
Yongzhen, supra note 198, at 40. The Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Com-
mission (FETAC) and Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC) were renamed in
June 1988 as the CIETAC and CMAC respectively.
203. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 199, at 269; Zongzhen, supra note 198, at 39. Also,
the conciliator is permitted to act as the arbitrator in the same dispute.
204. Civil Procedure Law of The People's Republic of China (For Trial Imple-
mentation), Oct. 1, 1982, arts. 6 (mediation should be stressed in trying civil cases) &
97-102 (authorize court to mediate if possible and "urge the parties to understand
each other's positions and reach an agreement"), reprinted in THE LAws OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1982) 259, 261, 276 (1987).
205. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 199, at 268-69; Holtzmann, A Case Study of Joint
Conciliation in Trade With China, in NEW TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE ROLE OF ARBITRAL AND OTHER INSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 182, at 225; Surrey & Soble, Recent Developments in Dispute Resolution
in the People's Republic of China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1983
373 U. Cohen ed. 1983).
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although a written agreement was never entered into.20 6
Others have also been confirmed with French and Italian trade
bodies. °7 The U.S. arrangement resulted in two joint concilia-
tions in the late 1970s, one of which was fully and successfully
completed.2 ° a
Ordinarily, a joint conciliation is conducted by the two rel-
evant trade organizations who each appoint a conciliator. The
conciliators correspond with the parties and themselves, and
then meet to formulate the recommendations which are, if the
conciliators can agree on the proposals, provided to the dispu-
tants. °2 0  As usual, if the process fails, the parties can move on
to arbitration.
Recently, however, the economic modernization plan and
the increase in commercial transactions with the West in the
post-1979 period, accompanied by statutory development, has
produced a shift in the Chinese orientation. Although
nonadjudicative resolution methods are still preferred for do-
mestic disputes, the formal mechanisms of arbitration and liti-
gation are being increasingly used in the PRC.2 1° In the inter-
national business context, although the same statutory or cul-
tural preference for the use of nonadjudicative methods also
continues, there is a growing trend in the PRC towards the use
of international commercial arbitration as a final step in the
dispute settlement process. 2 "t The effect, if any, that the re-
206. Holtzmann, supra note 205, at 226. FETAC was the predecessor of the
CIETAC.
207. Protocol for Settlement of Disputes Arising From China-France Industrial
Property Trade (1980) concluded between CCPIT and the Bureau of Industrial Prop-
erty of France; CCPIT-Italian Association for Arbitration Cooperation Agreement
(1981). Xunyi, supra note 198, at 349-50. West Germany has opened a Conciliation
Centre in Beijing and the Beijing-Hamburg Conciliation Centre has opened in the
Federal Republic, the two centres jointly formulating conciliation rules. Yongzhen,
supra note 198, at 38.
208. One other was initiated but was settled before the conciliators were ap-
pointed. Holtzmann, supra note 205, at 227-37.
209. Id.; Surrey & Soble, supra note 205, at 381-82.
210. Ross, supra note 197, at 63. Formal mechanisms are being accessed to a
greater degree due to their accessibility and cost-effectiveness, whereas informal
mechanisms are being seen as less effective in the resolution of disputes arising out
of increasingly complex economic relationships. Id.
211. Farina, supra note 198, at 138 (greater numbers of Sino-foreign contracts
and P.R.C. trade laws provide for international commercial arbitration); Grenner,
supra note 202, at 307 (from 1985-1987, number of Sino-foreign arbitrations con-
ducted in P.R.C. increased markedly, whereas number of conciliations did not).
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cent political disturbances in the PRC will have on this move-
ment cannot be fully determined.
The fact that a nation has a long tradition of resort to con-
ciliation as a mechanism for the settlement of domestic dis-
putes does not mean that it will be automatically used in inter-
national business disputes involving that country's nationals.
This behaviour is illustrated clearly in international business
transactions involving Japanese entities. Although the Chinese
do continue to rely to a greater extent on the conciliatory/
mediatory approaches in their international business relation-
ships, this attitude could alter if they continue to engage in
complex commercial transactions with Western parties. In-
deed, the dominant influence in the transnational business sys-
tem appears to be that of the West with its law consciousness
and its inclination towards the adjudicative forms of dispute
settlement, arbitration in particular. 2  Although a tendency
towards greater acceptance of conciliation can be seen in the
legislation of those Western nations with a Pacific Rim expo-
sure, in contractual practice the Western influences appear to
be stronger.
IV. THE VIABILITY OF CONCILIATION AS A MECHANISM
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS DISPUTES
There are a variety of advantages to the use of concilia-
tion, often in the comparative sense relative to litigation or ar-
bitration. Conciliation is less costly than the adjudicative
methods, as it is a relatively informal and expeditious process.
Also, if a small claim is involved, conciliation should be pre-
ferred since it will be more cost-effective than litigation.2 ,I
Like arbitration, party autonomy is emphasized and the dispu-
tants usually have considerable freedom to design the concilia-
tion process, including the choice of location and conciliators
with expertise in the relevant subject-matter. If the dispute is
of a type that warrants a wide-ranging or creative solution,
212. Weber, International Arbitration Is Gaining Acceptance Among Pacific Rim Traders,
7 CAL. LAw. 29, 31 (1987). The author argues that Asian parties are likely to increas-
ingly prefer arbitration over conciliation as a result of more complex commercial
relationships, a greater geographic diversity of companies involved, and the compar-
atively better enforcement mechanisms available for arbitral awards. See generally id.
213. Yamashita, supra note 185, at XIV 3-14.
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then conciliation, with its ability to design such proposals,
would be more appropriate than litigation with the restrictions
involved in rendering judgments. 2 4 Further, the information
and statements generated by the conciliation remain confiden-
tial unless the parties agree otherwise.
The informal conciliation environment is likely to be
warmer than that of the adjudicative forum. The compromis-
sory, "win-win" character of the conciliatory process is a major
advantage since it facilitates the maintenance of a harmonious
business relationship, whereas the use of an adjudicative form
may rupture this connection. Thus, conciliation should be pre-
ferred in situations where the parties wish to preserve their ex-
tant contractual and commercial ties.21 5 For example, concilia-
tion would facilitate the maintenance of a long-term contract
or joint venture relationship. 6 In addition, some entities
from the Eastern Pacific Rim may continue to have a cultural
preference for nonadjudicative settlement methods although,
as discussed, this inclination is not uniformly strong.
However, a number of drawbacks to the use of conciliation
can be posed. It has been argued that conciliation, because it
results in non-binding recommendations, is likely to be a waste
of time, effort, and money since the process may collapse en-
tirely or the recommendations may not be accepted by the dis-
putants. These are possible outcomes. Yet, conciliation can
and does result in successful settlement agreements between
the parties based on the conciliator's recommendations. Also,
if a state or state agency is involved, it may submit to third-
party dispute settlement only if the conciliation is non-binding
conciliation in order to avoid subjection to the binding deci-
sion of an adjudicative tribunal.2 17 Even if the conciliation
fails, the resultant costs will not have been inordinate, and
there will be some carry-over benefits that will enure to any
subsequent adjudication, such as clarification of facts and is-
sues and completed legal research.
The attainment of a settlement agreement may involve
contractual issues if the disputants are of unequal bargaining
214. Id.
215. Id.; Herrmann, supra note 144, at 173.
216. Brazil, Resolution of Trade Disputes in the Asian Pacific Region, 10 ADEL. L. REV.
49, at 51.
217. Herrmann, supra note 144, at 173.
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power. Potentially, one party could be coerced into an agree-
ment to accept the conciliator's recommendations which is not
wholly acceptable to it because of the superior economic
strength of the other. In this event, the weaker party would
have to rely on contractual relief through doctrines such as
economic duress or unconscionability. Alternatively, a weaker
disputant should consider its status when deciding whether to
try conciliation, and hope to be able to reject unsatisfactory
results, or to opt instead for an adjudicative method wherein
economic disparities are not immediately disadvantageous.
The enforceability of the settlement agreement can also
be problematic if one of the parties refuses to observe its
terms. A form of statutory enforcement exists, but only in lim-
ited jurisdictions. The contractual nature of a settlement
agreement necessitates the initiation of a legal action based in
contract in an attempt to get the recalcitrant party to honour
its obligations. The uncertainties involved may mute the ap-
peal of conciliation. Yet there are also uncertainties involved
in arbitration and litigation, including the major issue inherent
in their adversarial construct-the real possibility of the "win-
lose" outcome wherein one disputant may obtain no satisfac-
tion at all. In contrast, a successful conciliation typically re-
sults in a resolution that is of some benefit to both parties.
The best role for conciliation is as an optional, initial step
in a layered dispute resolution process. If conflict occurs, the
parties can decide at that future point whether conciliation
would be a viable mechanism. If it is successful and a settle-
ment agreement is reached, the substantial costs of adjudica-
tion are avoided. If conciliation fails, the disputants can pro-
ceed to other agreed modes of settlement and can benefit to a
certain degree from aspects of the conciliatory exercise. There
are, however, several factors that the disputants will have to
examine in the event of a dispute to determine the viability of
conciliation in the particular circumstances. First, the negotia-
bility of the parties' initial positions on the issue in dispute is a
precondition for a workable conciliation. The process will fail
quickly if the disputants' positions are so polarized and en-
trenched at the outset that there is no realistic possibility for
the compromise required to realize settlement. Second,
although conciliation can be used to solve legal disputes, it will
be an inappropriate mechanism if either disputant wishes to
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firmly establish the parameters of the applicable law, or if
mandatory regulatory legislation is involved. Although agree-
ments to arbitrate that involve statutory claims are being en-
forced by many courts,21 8 public policy and nonarbitrability
concerns still remain as potential barriers to the enforcement
of any arbitral award. Similar arguments could also apply to
counter the enforcement of conciliation settlement agree-
ments.
CONCLUSION
In theory, conciliation can fulfil a valuable role in transna-
tional economic dispute settlement as an early, informal pro-
cess that, if successful, obviates the necessity of resort to adju-
dicative mechanisms. It offers an objective third party to re-
solve a dispute while maintaining flexibility of procedure and
the ultimate freedom of the disputants to choose whether or
not to accept the conciliator's recommendations. Conciliation
is included in dispute resolution structures throughout the
transnational system in either its classic or hybrid forms. Yet,
in practice, conciliation is not frequently utilized, especially in
comparison with arbitration. The one exception to this obser-
vation occurs in the use of conciliation techniques in interna-
tional trade treaties, whether they be multilateral or bilateral.
The GATT and most free trade agreements include aspects of
conciliation in one form or another as an integral element of
conflict resolution. As these systems are the required mecha-
nisms for settling treaty disputes, the conciliatory techniques
are regularly utilized.
In contrast, although conciliation is occasionally found in
other treaty relationships and can be used to settle private dis-
putes, it is rarely used in either of these sectors when interna-
tional economic or business disputes are involved. This may
be due in part to the youth of many provisions containing the
conciliation option. However, the relatively greater use of ar-
bitration in agreements where both mechanisms are available
indicates that most disputants, whether they be states or pri-
vate entities, take the adjudicative route if the issue cannot be
218. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (providing enforcement of international commercial arbitration clause
and holding that antitrust claims are arbitrable).
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solved through negotiations. It is likely that this behaviour is
founded in the Western tradition of conflict determination
through binding, adversarial methods. The greater participa-
tion of Eastern players in the contemporary transnational eco-
nomic system has only slightly altered this orientation, usually
in states bordering on the Pacific Rim. It is questionable
whether this trend will continue or whether, instead, the newer
players will increasingly conform to the adjudication pattern.
Yet conciliation does serve a useful function within carefully
defined limits, and should be seriously considered when dis-
pute resolution structures are being drafted or accessed. Con-
ciliation deserves to be implemented more often than it is at
present as an initial step in a layered framework. It may expedi-
tiously resolve an international business dispute eliminating
the need for, but not the availability of, adjudicative settlement
mechanisms.
